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TAX ABATEMENTS AND PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL: A
MATCH NOT MADE IN YPSILANTI
"[Ihere's just so much confusion, you want to say to GM, damn you,
for tearing my family apart."1
"The consolidation of large-car production in Arlington will allow GM
to save about $800 per car ...Both the township and GM were hurt by
this case. We'd like to see the community realize this matter should not
proceed any further."'
INTRODUCTION
The Township of Ypsilanti was in a symbiotic relationship - in
return for long term property tax abatements provided by the mu-
nicipality, General Motors Corporation ("GM") provided steady
employment for the people of the community. Then things changed.
GM decided it would be better to make their cars somewhere else,
so they prepared to relocate their operations. In Charter Township
of Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp.,3 Ypsilanti sued in an attempt
to force GM to keep production and the corresponding jobs in its
community. The trial court judge found that plaintiffs sufficiently
proved a promissory estoppel claim to bind GM, and enjoined the
transfer of production." The court of appeals reversed,5 the Michi-
gan Supreme Court refused to hear the case,6 and General Motors
shut down Willow Run and transferred the production of Caprice
automobiles to a plant in Arlington, Texas.
1. David Lamb, Portrait of the Recession: Disposable Workers, Jobs Economy, L.A. TIMES,
May 15, 1993, at Al (quoting the wife of a displaced Willow Run spot welder).
2. Greg Gardner, Court Refuses Ypsilanti Appeal, DE . FREE PRESS, Sept. 4, 1993, at 9A
(quoting General Motors' attorney Lee Schutzman, as the injunction against GM closing Willow
Run expired and the plant was shut down). Note that General Motors focused on economic con-
cerns, despite a stipulation during trial that the issue of economic necessity was not a basis for the
decision to close the facility. See infra notes 328-31 and accompanying text (discussing the eco-
nomic necessity defense).
3. No. 92-43075-CK, 1993 WL 132385 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Feb. 9, 1993).
4. Id. at *14.
5. Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., 506 N.W.2d 556 (Mich. Ct. App.
1993).
6. Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., 509 N.W.2d 152 (Mich. 1993).
7. GM Proceeds With Plant Closing, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 1993, at A4.
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This Note explores the decisions of both courts, beginning by ex-
amining the use of tax abatements as an economic incentive., The
ineffectiveness and continued popularity of abatements are described
in the context of "the race to the bottom."9 The focus then shifts to
promissory estoppel law, first generally, and then in a brief histori-
cal review leading into a description of the precedents which address
the application of this equitable doctrine to plant closures. 10
Next, the trial and appellate court opinions are discussed in de-
tail, with a preliminary summary of Public Act 198, the statutory
authority for granting tax abatements in Michigan, and a detailed
history of the relationship between Ypsilanti and General Motors."
An in-depth look at the law and reasoning behind the various court
opinions is also presented. 12
The Analysis section begins with a description of why tax abate-
ments are not an effective tool for increasing and maintaining the
amount of production in a particular community.' Next, the use of
promissory estoppel to prevent plant closures is advocated," leading
to the ultimate contention that the trial court was correct in its use
of the doctrine to enjoin General Motors' departure from Ypsilanti
after the receipt of Act 198 abatements. The case itself is examined
by scrutinizing the promise, how it was made, and abuses of discre-
tion by the appellate court in reviewing and reversing the lower
court's factual determination that a promise existed.' 5 Questions of
reasonable reliance by Ypsilanti and the economic necessity defense
round out the study of the case.' Finally, Ypsilanti is compared to
precedents which discussed the use of promissory estoppel to prevent
a plant closure, as well as to an analogous case on which the appel-
late court relied, followed by Impact and Conclusion sections dis-
cussing the deleterious effects of the decision on the people and com-
munity of Ypsilanti.' 7
8. See infra notes 18-38 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 39-54 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 55-143 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 144-90 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 191-251 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 252-69 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 270-74 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 275-313 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 314-31 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 332-79 and accompanying text.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Tax Abatements
States have used economic incentives to attract businesses since at
least 1791, when New Jersey offered tax abatements to Alexander
Hamilton to locate his manufacturing plant in that state.18 The
number and type of incentives are limited only by the creativity of
the various legislatures who enact them.19 The use of economic in-
centives continues to increase.2 0 Property tax abatements similar to
Michigan's Public Act 198 ("P.A. 198")21 are the most common
form of tax incentive at the local or municipal level. 2 Public Act
198, and presumably most local property tax abatements, are
designed to encourage businesses to remain or to locate in a particu-
lar community2 s by offsetting relatively high property taxes24 in or-
der "to encourage capital investment and job growth . . . by . . .
moderniz[ing] or restor[ing] obsolete industrial facilities. ' 25  The
legislature amended the Michigan statute to include similar incen-
18. Andrew Kolesar, Note, Can State and Local Tax Incentives and Other Contributions Stim-
ulate Economic Development, 44 TAX LAW. 285, 286 (1990). Tax abatement is defined as
"[d]imunition or decrease in the amount of tax imposed. Abatement of taxes relieves property of
its share of the burdens of taxation after the assessment has been made and the tax levied."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 4 (6th ed. 1990).
19. Martin E. Gold, Economic Development Projects: A Perspective, 19 URn. LAW. 193, 193
(1987) (listing real property exemptions, low-interest loans, loan guarantees, grants, sales tax ex-
emptions, reduced energy costs, tax-exempt bond financing, and subsidized rent as incentives used
by state and local governments); Kolesar, supra note 18, at 287.
During 1993, Mercedes-Benz A.G. was seeking a site for a new production facility. As part of a
successful attempt to lure the plant into their state, Alabama Governor Jim Folsom rushed a tax
concession law through the state legislature, offered to spend tens of millions of dollars to buy
Mercedes vehicles for state use, bought resident's homes and property in order to offer the car
maker the exact parcel of land it sought, and at the last minute, agreed to place the company's
distinctive emblem on the top of the scoreboard for a televised Alabama-Tennessee football game.
E.S. Browning & Helene Cooper, Ante Up: States' Bidding War Over Mercedes Plant Made for
Costly Chase, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 1993, at Al.
20. Kolesar, supra note 18, at 286; Mark Taylor, Note, A Proposal to Prohibit Industrial
Relocation Subsidies, 72 TEX. L. REv. 669, 683 (1994); see Marco Menezes & Lawrence W.
Morgan, P.A. 198: Michigan's Industrial Property Tax Abatement Law: Fortuity or Futility?, 7
COOLEY L. REV. 139, 139 (1990) (stating that governmental units have been adopting financial
incentives to business and industry).
21. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 207.551-207.571 (1975).
22. Kolesar, supra note 18, at 287; Taylor, supra note 20, at 675-76 (citing Gold, supra note
19, at 198).
23. Menezes & Morgan, supra note 20, at 140; see also Taylor, supra note 20, at 675 (indicat-
ing that economic incentives generally are used to induce industry to locate, remain, or expand
within the grantor's boundaries).
24. Menezes & Morgan, supra note 20, at .141.
25. Id. at 160.
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tives to draw in new industrial facilities as well.2 6 States and com-
munities also use abatements to promote their "pro-business cli-
mate" and create the impression that they are actively pursuing
business and industry for their constituency.2 7 "Although no reliable
data is available, it has been estimated that the states have given
away 'hundreds of millions, perhaps billions of dollars in economic
incentives' ",28 to persuade industries to relocate to, or remain in, a
particular location.
Somewhat surprisingly, experts and commentators generally
agree that tax abatements and other incentives play, at best, a mi-
nor role in a corporation's location decision.2 9 A myriad of other
factors play into the corporation's decision, most, if not all, weighing
more heavily than tax considerations.8 0 A major component leading
26. Id. at 142. The initial formulation of P.A. 198, which only provided for plant rehabilitation,
was deemed discriminatory against Michigan firms wishing to expand within the state, and non-
Michigan firms wishing to immigrate into the state. Id. Accordingly, similar incentives were pro-
vided for new industrial construction. Id.
27. Kolesar, supra note 18, at 287-89; George W. Morse & Michael C. Farmer, Location and
Investment Effects of a Tax Abatement Program, 39 NAT'L TAX J. 229, 235 (1986); Taylor,
supra note 20, at 692 (citing MARTIN TOLCHIN & SUSAN TOLCHIN, BUYING INTO AMERICA 64
(1988)).
Governments are willing to do more than provide economic incentives in order to appear pro-
business. During competition for GM's Saturn production plant, the Illinois legislature passed a
mandatory seat-belt law, thus decreasing the chances of auto-maker opposed federal air-bag legis-
lation being enacted and signaling to GM the legislature's willingness to cooperate. Kolesar, supra
note 18, at 288. During the competition for a Mercedes-Benz facility, South Carolina "promised
to move eight endangered red-cockaded woodpeckers in order to overcome environmental
problems at its proposed site." Browning & Cooper, supra note 19, at A6.
28. Kolesar, supra note 18, at 286 (citing Vaughan, State Tax Incentives: How Effective Are
They?, COMMENTARY, Jan. 1980, at 3). "By 1987, Michigan municipalities granted over 6,000
property tax abatements under PA 198, exempting over $9,000,000,000 of otherwise taxable prop-
erty." Menezes & Morgan, supra note 20, at 143 n.43 (citing Martin, Do Property Tax Abate-
ments Make a Difference?, THE MICH. ASSESSOR, July 1989, at 27).
29. Morse & Farmer, supra note 27, at 229; see Kolesar, supra note 18, at 285 n.2 (including
extensive cite list of works supporting and opposing the idea that tax incentives do not influence
location decisions); Browning & Cooper, supra note 19, at A6 (stating Mercedes' official position
that incentives were not its primary reason for choosing Alabama). But see Taylor, supra note 20,
at 683 (arguing the best evidence of incentives' effectiveness is the frequency of their use).
30. Plant or site availability, transportation costs, labor costs, proximity to raw materials and
markets, and quality of public services are all considerations which weigh into location decisions.
Paul Barron, Causes and Impact of Plant Shutdowns and Relocations and Potential Non-NLRA
Responses, 58 TUL. L. REV. 1389, 1395 (1984) (indicating that state regulation of business and
the "social wage" costs are the most important considerations in the location decision); see Kole-
sar, supra note 18, at 289-300 (examining factors by analyzing a case study of General Motors'
Saturn plant site selection process); cf Taylor, supra note 20, at 683 (arguing economic incentives
do play a significant role in location decisions, at least as "tie-breakers") (citing Jack Lyne, Incen-
tives Are Important, Executives Say, but Business Concerns Drive the Location Process, 37 SITE
SELECTION 282, 283-84 (1992)).
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to debate on the topic is the lack of corporations' desire to disclose
the true weight given to tax considerations.3'
For a government unit to determine if a tax abatement will be
worthwhile for the community, the government unit must conduct a
type of cost/benefit analysis.32 Such analysis aids in determining
whether "the revenue lost due to tax abatement and other economic
incentives plus the increased public expenditure due to the new ac-
tivity (services plus other grants) is less than the increased revenue
generated by the new activity."'3 Tax incentives typically cost the
public in two ways. First, the taxing unit will not receive income
from the taxes which are waived or reduced by the incentive.3" Sec-
ond, the amount of governmental services which must be provided
will increase because of the demands made by the new business.3 5
The unit of government which is offering the tax incentive must de-
termine how the combined costs of offering the incentive compare to
the revenue or other benefits which will be generated for the area by
the recipient of the incentive.36 Essentially, the government must de-
cide if the tax dollars "spent" as a result of the incentive program,
return more than the cost of the investment. 7 Such analysis often
reveals more costs and burdens then benefits. 3
31. Kolesar, supra note 18, at 293. Even if no weight is given to tax considerations, corpora-
tions still prosper by allowing or encouraging competition between potential sites to provide the
greatest possible incentive. Id. The granting of an abatement to an industry which would make the
same location decision regardless of the incentive creates a windfall for that company. See
Menezes & Morgan, supra note 20, at 160.
32. See Kolesar, supra note 18, at 300 (balancing loss of revenue with benefits in an "economic
analysis for business development").
33. Id.; see Morse & Farmer, supra note 27, at 229 (concluding that, in granting an abate-
ment, if schools do not receive additional aid, the abatements are economically irrational); Taylor,
supra note 20, at 683-84 (indicating "positive externalities" must be considered in determining an
appropriate recipient of incentives).
34. Kolesar, supra note 18, at 300.
35. See Gold, supra note 19, at 194 (indicating that the need for public transportation or road
access is viewed by industry as a substantial problem necessitating public involvement in the pro-
ject); Browning & Cooper, supra note 19, at A6 (stating that all states involved in the competition
for a Mercedes production facility were willing to provide a state funded welcome center near the
factory and eighteen months of employee-training programs). Some of these costs will prove to be
beneficial, even if the industry relocates quickly. See Kolesar, supra note 18, at 286-87, 311 (indi-
cating grants for worker education and improvements in infrastructure will persist and make the
area more attractive to future businesses).
36. Kolesar, supra note 18, at 300; see Taylor, supra note 20, at 679-83 (discussing the poten-
tial misallocation of resources and inappropriate selection of aid recipients if a proper balancing is
not conducted) (citing PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMIcs 590-91 (13th
ed. 1989) and PAUL WONNACOTT & RONALD WONNACOTT, ECONOMICS 434-50 (1979)).
37. Kolesar, supra note 18, at 300.
38. Id. at 298 ("[M]ost analysts conclude that the disadvantages outweigh the benefits."). But
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B. Tax Abatement Popularity - "A Race to the Bottom"
Despite the general consensus that tax abatements play only a
minor role in a corporation's location decision, use of tax abate-
ments continues to rise, remaining the most popular incentive at the
local level.89 In part, this can be attributed to the "common sense"
view that if a corporation can save tax dollars at one location, that
location will appear more attractive than one where no money can
be saved."' The lack of empirical evidence on the subject exacer-
bates this perception."1 The lack of evidence can be attributed in
part to the governing bodies themselves, who may desire political
unaccountability in case of negative repercussions resulting from a
failed abatement plan.42 "Economic incentives . . .will live on,
mainly because the political rewards are still tempting. . . .The
fact that the effects of the incentive programs may not be felt, or at
least documented, until years later, if at all, gives the government
more freedom to participate in the competitions for new busi-
nesses." 4 This competition has been termed "the race to the
bottom."""
see Menezes & Morgan, supra note 20, at 150 (noting that a Department of Commerce study
indicated that the economic benefits would outweigh costs for most communities granting an
abatement); Taylor, supra note 20, at 682-83 (indicating that lack of quantifiable data makes the
determination of relative costs and benefits of incentives difficult, if not impossible, to determine).
39. See supra notes 18-28 and accompanying text (explaining the popularity of tax
abatements).
40. See supra note 31 (discussing the link between tax abatements and corporate savings).
41. See supra note 39, Kolesar, supra note 18, at 300.
42. See Kolesar, supra note 18, at 306-07 (governing bodies put a different spin on abatements
for different interest groups in an attempt to appease many different constituents). "'There seems
to be very little accountability over [the granting of abatements]. Nobody does any follow-up, and
nobody does any cost benefit analysis.'" Browning & Cooper, supra note 19, at Al (quoting
Douglas Woodward, associate professor of economics at the University of South Carolina).
There are other political dangers associated with the granting of governmental subsidies. They
include the unnecessary concentration of decision-making power in the hands of government offi-
cials, which is exacerbated by the delegation of such power to appointed, rather than elected,
officials. Taylor, supra note 20, at 686-87. This "allows elected officials to disclaim responsibility
for the actions of the bureaucrats they empower." Id. at 687. Accountability is further reduced by
the common practice of combining incentives from a variety of different entities. Id. Finally, terms
of incentive packages are frequently kept secret in order to prevent competing states or communi-
ties from using the information to improve their bids. Id. at 688.
One additional factor leading to the lack of information on the effects of incentives may be the
short term view taken by politicians and corporations, focusing on immediate gratification, such as
reelection or current quarter gains at the expense of long-term profitability. Kolesar, supra note
18, at 306, 311.
43. Kolesar, supra note 18, at 307.
44. The race to the bottom occurs where governmental units give away larger and larger incen-
tives to corporations in an attempt to out do one another, until they have given away so much that
1306 [Vol. 44:1301
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In the race to the bottom, governing bodies give away greater and
greater incentives, all the while approaching, or tragically surpass-
ing, the break-even point of the burden/benefit analysis."b
The widespread availability of subsidies has created an environment in
which cities and states attempt to outbid each other to attract large indus-
trial plants. The corporations planning new plants openly encourage inter-
ested cities to match other cities' offers, and thus [,] the corporations extract
ever higher concessions from the municipalities.'
The ability in today's market to move capital quickly and easily
intensifies the race to the bottom. Corporations concerned with
only the bottom line48 can relocate in the name of profit almost
spontaneously, without regard for the consequences which befall the
community affected by the decision.49 Where no legal mechanism
they are no longer benefiting from the presence of the corporation. Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race
to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law,
76 Nw. U. L. REV. 913, 913-23 (1982); Kolesar, supra note 18, at 310.
The race to the bottom occurs in many contexts. See, e.g., Alan E. Garfield, Comment, Evalu-
ating State Anti-Takeover Legislation: A Broadminded New Approach to Corporation Law or "A
Race to the Bottom"?, 1990 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 119, 125-28 (applying a "shareholder welfare"
standard to takeover legislation); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Re-
thinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1210, 1213-47 (1992) (challenging the "race to the bottom" argument as questioning
federal environmental statutes); Clark D. Stith, Note, Federalism and Company Law: A "Race to
the Bottom" in the European Community, 79 GEO. L.J. 1581 (1991) (arguing that the European
Commission has laid a foundation for the race in its efforts to harmonize company law).
45. See Kolesar, supra note 18, at 307-08 (recognizing that economic incentives will continue
to be offered despite resulting burdens).
Too many states and localities are currently engaged in the "race to the bottom."
They are competing for how much they can arrange for their local citizens to give
away in subsidies, lower wages, and damage to the environment, not how much they
can be sure of gaining in return; they are competing for how fearful and meagerly
paid, not how skilled and secure, the work force of their state or area is going to be.
Admittedly, local governments are often responding to forces over which they have
little control.
Fran Ansley, Standing Rusty and Rolling Empty: Law, Poverty, and America's Eroding Indus-
trial Base, 81 GEO. L.J. 1757, 1781-82 (1993) (citations omitted).
46. Taylor, supra note 20, at 677.
47. Ansley, supra note 45, at 1764.
48. "One near legendary formulation by a steel executive that captures this ethic in all its utter
reasonableness and perversity goes something like this: 'We are not in this business to make steel.
We're in it to make money.'" Id. at 1764 n.20.
49. "Large conglomerates have no particular attachment to a given facility or community
.Barron, supra note 30, at 1393; see also Ansley, supra note 45, at 1767 (stating that the
devastating effect of the collapse of the steel industry in Youngstown, Ohio is compared by people
in the community to the news of the bombing of Pearl Harbor) (citing Staughton Lynd, Towards
a Not-For-Profit Economy: Public Development Authorities for Acquisition and Use of Indus-
trial Property, 22 HARV. CR.-C.L. L. REV. 13, 16-17 (1987)). Many corporations will also pit
communities against one another in a bidding war in order to maximize incentives. Id. at 1774;
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exists to bind the corporation to a community which has offered eco-
nomic incentives,50 it may only be a matter of time until a plant
closure becomes a harsh reality with which the community must
deal." This Note focuses on one community's attempt to deal with
this predicament 2 through the use of the legal system,53 and the
equitable doctrine known as promissory estoppel.54
C. Promissory Estoppel Law Generally
Promissory estoppel is a method by which one who makes a prom-
ise to another on which that person relies by altering their position,
is prevented from denying the enforceability of the promise because
it failed to contain the elements of a contract.5 5 This seemingly fair
and simple principle of equity explains any number of early deci-
sions which were nearly, or sometimes completely, inexplicable
Taylor, supra note 20, at 677 ("The corporations planning new plants openly encourage interested
cities to match other cities' offers, and thus the corporations extract ever higher concessions from
the municipalities.").
50. See Taylor, supra note 20, at 701-12 (proposing federal regulations to limit industrial
incentives).
51. See Lee Hamilton, et. al., Hard Times and Vulnerable People: Initial Effects of Plant
Closings on Autoworkers' Mental Health, 31 HEALTH & Soc. BEHAV. 123 (1990) (discussing the
human impact of plant closures).
52. There is a paradox underlying this case, and tax abatements generally, which is laid out
very nicely in a Detroit Free Press editorial.
[If it is ruled that] General Motors, having accepted a tax abatement for its Willow
Run assembly plant, cannot now close the plant without compensating Ypsilanti
Township, that will force a rethinking of what abatements mean and will undermine
the abatement program. You have to wonder whether a business would ever accept
another abatement if it represents a binding promise to the community.
And . . . if it is ruled that GM took on no obligation when it accepted the abate-
ment, the case will pretty well prove that abatements do not give communities the
development tools they were supposed to represent. Then you have to wonder whether
any community, seeing how unenforceable the promises associated with an abatement
can be, would ever again grant one.
Either way, the state will be forced to face what has been obvious to us for some
time: that the abatement law has not done for Michigan what it was supposed to
do ....
Willow Run Shows Why Tax Abatements Don't Work, DET. FREE PRESS, Feb. 11, 1993, at 12A.
53. See infra note 144 and accompanying text (indicating Ypsilanti filed a lawsuit to prevent
the closure of the Willow Run production facility).
54. See infra note 147 and accompanying text (noting that Ypsilanti based their prayer for
relief in equity on promissory estoppel grounds).
55. LAURENCE P. SIMPSON, CONTRACTS § 61 (2d ed. 1965).
The doctrine of [promissory] estoppel rests upon a party having, directly or indirectly,
made assertions, promises or assurances upon which another has acted under such
circumstances that he would be seriously prejudiced if the assertions were suffered to
be disproved, or the promises or assurances to be withdrawn.
Maxwell v. Bay City Bridge Co., 2 N.W. 639, 646-47 (Mich. 1879).
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under traditional theories of consideration. Moreover, promissory
estoppel is an excellent illustration of the expansion occurring in
contract law, for promissory estoppel is based on the principle of
reliance, which underlies and creates the unfairness sought to be
relieved. 7
The doctrine of promissory estoppel, and reliance as a basis for
recovery, faced vehement opposition during the late nineteenth cen-
tury from some of the greatest legal scholars of all time.5 8 The doc-
trines were criticized as being incompatible with the laissez-faire ec-
onomics of the time, as well as with the bargain theory of
consideration. 9 This represented a change in outlook from the pre-
vious century, when reliance played a major role in the pre-contract
action of assumpsit, 0 as well as in the formation of simple con-
tracts.6 ' Despite the open hostility toward reliance in the late 1800s,
56. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 6.2 (3d ed. 1987) (providing
examples).
57. There is much debate among commentators regarding whether reliance is truly the defini-
tive element in promissory estoppel. See, e.g., Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The Promissory Basis
of Section 90, 101 YALE L.J. 111 (1991) (discussing whether the true basis of enforcement is on
the promise, or the reliance). For an argument that the entire conceptual basis of contract law
which gave rise to promissory estoppel has "moved on," and that promissory estoppel is no longer
an appropriate basis for recovery, see Jay M. Feinman, The Last Promissory Estoppel Article, 61
FORDHAM L. REV. 303 (1992) [hereinafter Feinman, Promissory Estoppel] (using Yorio & Thel
as the framework for the discussion). For an economic based theory, see Daniel A. Farber & John
H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the "Invisible Handshake," 52 U.
CHI. L. REV. 903, 905 (1985) (expressing the idea that promissory estoppel has been extended to
the point that "any promise made in furtherance of an economic activity is enforceable").
58. Oliver Wendell Holmes said reliance "would cut up the doctrine of consideration by the
roots, if a promisee could make a gratuitous promise binding by subsequently acting in reliance on
it." Commonwealth v. Scituate Sav. Bank, 137 Mass. 301, 302 (1884). For a detailed history of
the development of the doctrine, see Benjamin F. Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Principle From
Precedents: 1, 50 MICH. L. REV. 639 (1952) [hereinafter Boyer, Principle From Precedents].
59. See Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and Reliance on Illu-
sory Promises, 44 Sw. L.J. 841, 844-45 nn. 16-24 (1990) [hereinafter Metzger & Phillips, Reli-
ance] (quoting authors and different perspectives of the reliance principle and laissez-faire
doctrine).
60. Assumpsit was an early equitable doctrine meaning that the defendant undertook to do
something, and then did it to the plaintiff's detriment. I E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH
ON CONTRACTS § 1.6 (1990) [hereinafter FARNSWORTH]. The doctrine allowed for the assumption
of a duty to act, or a promise, from the facts of a case, and represented an effort by common law
courts to move into the Chancellor's equitable territory. See Judy B. Sloan, Quantum Meruit:
Residual Equity in Law, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 399, 417-26 (1992) (discussing the development of
assumpsit). See generally F. B. Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1888)
(relating the history of express assumpsit).
61. Metzger & Phillips, Reliance, supra note 59, at 842-43 (citing 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON &
GEORGE J. THOMPSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 139, at 502 (2d ed. 1936)); P.
S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 185 (1979); Jay M. Feinman, Prom-
issory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 HARV. L. REV. 678, 679 (1984) [hereinafter Feinman,
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in several categories of cases, the courts allowed recovery for the
promisee's reliance on gratuitous promises, also known as donative
promises.62 Because of the promisor's intent to give something and
receive nothing in return, the gratuitous promise cases did not meet
the contractual criteria of consideration. 3 The cases in which courts
enforced promises, despite the lack of consideration, included
promises within the family,"4 promises to convey land,65 gratuitous
bailments, 6 and charitable subscriptions.6 " As the twentieth century
Estoppel and Judicial]).
62. FARNSWORTH, supra note 60, § 2.19.
63. Consideration is one element of contract formation. Id. § 1.6. It is most easily seen as the
quid pro quo, or exchange of value made between the parties. Id. Each side must give up some-
thing in return for what they receive from the contract. Id.
64. Early decisions like Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131 (1845), and Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E.
256 (N.Y. 1891) (discussed in CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 56, § 4.5) exemplify the "old"
method of forcing cases into traditional doctrine. The cases are readily understood, and in fact
make logical sense, when analyzed in terms of Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898),
which recognized the lack of consideration in a promise from a grandfather to his granddaughter
that he would support her financially should she decide to refrain from working. The court en-
forced the promise against the grandfather's estate, despite the lack of consideration, by extending
the doctrine of estoppel in pals (equitable estoppel) from representations of fact relied on, to
promises detrimentally relied on. See, e.g., CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 56, § 6.2(a).
65. Although this situation generally arises in a family context, courts have taken two interest-
ing approaches to avoid using reliance as a basis for recovery. One method is "an analogy from
the law of gifts, treating the entry upon the land and making improvements as the equivalent of
physical delivery of a chattel." CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 56, § 6.2(b). Additionally,
courts have treated the making of improvements as "good consideration in equity." Id. The dis-
tinction between consideration at law and at equity seems strange at best, and indeed it is now
recognized that these decisions are based on promissory estoppel. Id.
. 66. Early gratuitous bailment cases also showed the requisite conflict between ideas of consider-
ation and reliance. The distinction drawn was that between misfeasance and nonfeasance. In these
cases, if the promisor (to procure insurance for another, or some similar scenario) completely fails
to act, and never takes possession, it will be nonfeasance, and no liability will attach. Should the
promisor act negligently, or fail to live up to a promise whose performance was begun by taking
possession, it will be misfeasance, and contractual liability will attach. For a similar distinction
between misfeasance and nonfeasance, see FARNSWORTH, supra note 60, § 1.6. Many courts have
recognized that the misfeasance cases are properly decided under promissory estoppel, and have so
concluded, falling in with the trend to recognize reliance as a basis for recovery. CALAMARI &
PERILLO, supra note 56, § 6.2(c). Accordingly, many nonfeasance cases will still result in no
liability, but are justified on the grounds that reliance cannot be reasonable if the bailee has not
taken possession. Id.
67. Charitable subscriptions have consistently been enforced in this country, the only difference
between the cases being which tenuous theory supported the decision. CALAMARI & PERILLO,
supra note 56, § 6.2(d). The underlying theme is the strong public policy favoring enforcement of
such a promise. Id. The use of promissory estoppel seems at first glance to be a tailor-made
solution. Id. Yet, it may fall short due to the inability to show detrimental reliance on the part of
the charity receiver, because it does not act differently than it would have without receiving the
promise. Id. This difficulty, and the policy considerations, prompted the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts to mandate that charitable prescriptions be per se enforceable under promissory estop-
pcl, thus ending the litany of poorly supported decisions. Id.
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progressed, this accumulation of cases forced the recognition68 and
establishment of reliance as an acceptable basis for recovery. 9 Sa-
muel Williston is credited with coining the phrase "promissory es-
toppel, ' ' 70 although it was Arthur Corbin who won promissory estop-
pel's inclusion in the initial Restatement of Contracts.7' Although
the doctrine gained "official" acknowledgement, many judges were
reluctant to recognize promissory estoppel.72
1. Early Promissory Estoppel Cases
Promissory estoppel as a method to enforce promises relied on to
the promisee's detriment moved beyond the limited settings noted
above, and into the commercial setting in Drennan v. Star Paving
Co.73 In Drennan, a general contractor relied on a sub-contractor's
implied promise not to revoke a bid when calculating the total bid
that the general contractor submitted to a potential customer. 74 Be-
cause the subcontractor not only had reason to expect the contractor
to rely on his bid, but wanted him to rely on the bid, and because
the general contractor became bound by submission of the bid to the
customer, the court held the general contractor must be allowed to
68. An early academic endeavor recognizing the use of reliance as a basis of recovery was L. L.
Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pts. I & 2), 46
YALE L.J. 52 (1936), 46 YALE L.J. 373 (1937), called "one of the greatest of all law review
articles" in Feinman, Promissory Estoppel, supra note 57, at 303.
69. "A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of
a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action
or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." RE-
STATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932).
70. Benjamin F. Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Requirements and Limitations of the Doctrine,
98 U. PA. L. REV. 459, 459 n.1 (1950) [hereinafter Boyer, Requirements and Limitations] (citing
1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 139, at 308 (1st ed. 1920)).
71. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 60-64 (1974) (discussing the contrast
between section 75, the traditional 'Holmesian' view of strict consideration, and section 90). Gil-
more highlights Corbin's success, which was won simply by bringing in a tremendous list of cases
imposing contractual liability which would not fit the section 75 definition of consideration and
challenging the Restaters to explain the cases under the Restaters' definitive compendium of the
common law without the inclusion of a substitute for consideration. Id. at 62-64. Section 90 was
included. Id. at 64; see Metzger & Phillips, Reliance, supra note 59, at 848-49 (discussing the
elements and application of section 90).
72. See, e.g., James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 64 F.2d 344, 346 (2d Cir. 1933) (holding
that promissory estoppel should be confined to the donative promise setting). Here, again, we see a
well respected jurist, Learned Hand, arguing against the use of promissory estoppel. See supra
notes 58-69 and accompanying text (discussing the widespread opposition to the doctrine).
73. 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958). This case is also an excellent example of a type of case (contrac-
tor/subcontractor bids) where promissory estoppel has received a tremendous amount of use. See
CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 56, § 6.5(a).
74. Drennan, 333 P.2d at 760.
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rely on the promise made by the subcontractor.7 5 Promissory estop-
pel prevented the subcontractor from breaking his promise to do the
work agreed to for the price agreed to, after the general contractor
relied on the promise. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts ex-
plicitly accepted the result from Drennan in Section 87,76 and also
made various changes to the text of Restatement Section 90.7
The extension of the doctrine continued, as promissory estoppel
was soon used to enforce indefinite promises in Hoffman v. Red Owl
Stores, Inc.78 In Hoffman, the court held that promissory estoppel
does not require reliance so comprehensive as to qualify as an offer
that would ripen into a contract, should the offer be accepted. 9
More controversially, the Hoffman court held that equating promis-
sory estoppel with a breach of contract action is a mistake.80 This
was one of the first cases indicating that promissory estoppel was on
its way to becoming a separate and distinct theory of recovery."'
The extension of the doctrine continued further, as courts became
willing to use promissory estoppel to enforce even the arguably illu-
75. Id. This, in effect, created an option contract through detrimental reliance, rather than
partial performance. JOHN E. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 43, at 126 (3d ed. 1990).
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87(2) illus. 6 (1981).
77. The text of section 90 was modified for the RESTATEMENT (SECOND). It reads:
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or for-
bearance on the part of the promisee . . . and which does induce such action or for-
bearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.
(2) A charitable subscription or a marriage settlement is binding under Subsection
(1) without proof that the promise induced action or forbearance.
Id. § 90.
It has been argued that the changes in the text, including the deletion of the "definite and sub-
stantial character" of the reliance, as well as the addition of a limitation on damages "as justice
requires," is evidence of the increasing trend to base recovery on reliance. Feinman, Promissory
Estoppel, supra note 57, at 305-06.
78. 133 N.W.2d 267, 273 (Wis. 1965) (holding that the indefiniteness was sufficient to indicate
a lack of intent to be bound, yet promissory estoppel would support a claim despite the absence).
For a discussion of Hoffman, see Bruce A. Coggeshall, Note, Contracts: Reliance Losses: Promis-
sory Estoppel as a Basis of Recovery for Breach of Agreement to Agree: Hoffman v. Red Owl
Stores, Inc., 51 CORNELL L.Q. 351 (1966).
79. Hoffman, 133 N.W.2d at 275.
80. 4d.
81. See Farber & Matheson, supra note 57, at 907-45 (documenting the decreased role of
reliance in promissory estoppel decisions and proposing a new economic based theory of recovery
under the doctrine); Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, The Emergence of Promissory
Estoppel as an Independent Theory of Recovery, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 472, 508-50 (1983) [here-
inafter Metzger & Phillips, Independent Theory] (describing the growth of the doctrine of prom-
issory estoppel); cf GILMORE, supra note 71, at 94 (arguing that contract and tort will eventually
be swallowed up by one great theory of civil liability).
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sory promise. 81 "From its humble origins as a substitute for consid-
eration in donative promise cases, this reliance-based doctrine has
come to enjoy application in a wide variety of contexts.""3 Many
commentators have argued for further extension of promissory es-
toppel in order to protect an even greater number of future
plaintiffs.84
2. Promissory Estoppel and Plant Closures
Despite the continued growth and expansion of the doctrine, one
application of promissory estoppel which has not been recognized is
as a method to prevent plant closures.85 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit declined the opportunity to extend the
equitable doctrine to such a case in Local 1330, United Steel Work-
ers of America v. United States Steel Corporation.8" In Local, the
82. See, e.g., Hunter v. Hayes, 533 P.2d 952 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975) (applying promissory estop-
pel to a case where there was a meeting of the minds); Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306
N.W.2d 114, 116 (Minn. 1981) (holding that a promise for an employment at will contract, which
is necessarily illusory, is sufficient to support a promissory estoppel claim). These cases are dis-
cussed in Metzger & Phillips, Reliance, supra note 59, at 856-63 (arguing for the acceptance of
promissory estoppel protection for those detrimentally relying on illusory promises).
83. Metzger & Phillips, Reliance, supra note 59, at 841 (citations omitted). For a limited list
of situations allowing recovery based on promissory estoppel, see CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra
note 56, § 6.3 nn. 85-90 and accompanying text (listing various types of cases which have allowed
recovery based on promissory estoppel); FARNSWORTH, supra note 60, § 2.19 n.27 (providing a list
of types of cases allowing recovery based on promissory estoppel).
84. It has been argued that promissory estoppel was created, and is properly applied, in order
to protect the ability to rely on promises in an economic setting. Farber & Matheson, supra note
57, at 904-05, 925-30. The ability to trust, where trust is essential, must be protected, and promis-
sory estoppel is the appropriate vehicle for that goal. See id. at 925-30 (discussing promissory
obligations and economic benefits in ongoing relationships). The importance of trust, and its value
to society, form the basis of the entitlement to rely on promises made in an economic setting. Id.
Accordingly, "any promise made in furtherance of an economic activity is enforceable." Id. at
905, cited in State Bank of Standish v. Curry, 500 N.W.2d 104, 108 (Mich. 1993), the Michigan
Supreme Court's recent statement on the law of promissory estoppel.
85. Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., No. 92-43075-CK, 1993 WL
132385, at *13 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Feb. 9, 1993) (holding that the closing of a plant before the
expiration of a collective bargaining agreement did not constitute breach of agreement based on
ground of promissory estoppel) (citing Abbington v. Dayton Malleable, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 1290
(S.D. Ohio 1983), affid, 738 F.2d 438 (6th Cir. 1984); Local 1330, United Steel Workers of Am.
v. United States Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980)).
86. 631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980). The opinion cites the district court, stating:
United States Steel should not be permitted to leave the Youngstown area devastated
after drawing from the lifeblood of the community for so many years. Unfortunately,
the mechanism to reach this ideal settlement . . . is not now in existence in the code
of laws of our nation. . . .[T]his Court has found that no contract or enforceable
promise was entered into by the company and ...there is clear evidence to support
the company's decision that the plants were not profitable.
Id. at 1266.
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plaintiffs alleged that promises were made by the United States
Steel Corporation in oral statements made and repeated over the
company "hotline," which consisted of telephones within the plants
strategically located so employees could hear pre-recorded manage-
ment policy statements. 7 Amid much speculation that the Ohio and
McDonald Works plants in Youngstown, Ohio would be shut down
in the fall of 1977, U.S. Steel management began a series of "hot-
line" messages indicating that the plant was not scheduled to be
closed.8 8 However, the messages did announce that steps would need
to be taken to improve the plants' profitability, and that profit-mak-
ing was essential to keeping the plants open.89 Over the course of
time, the messages did indicate a supposed turn around in profitabil-
ity.90 In late 1979, statements were made to the effect that the
plants were again profitable,9 and there were no plans for a shut-
down.92 Despite these declarations by the corporation, plans for the
cessation of operations at both facilities were commenced. The
plaintiffs filed suit in an attempt to prevent the plant closure based
on, among other theories, promissory estoppel. 98
The district court rejected the plaintiff's promissory estoppel
claim on three grounds. 4 The appellate court found most compel-
ling the fact that "there [was] clear evidence to support the com-
pany's decision that the plants were not profitable" 95 and as such,
"[t]he condition precedent of the alleged contract and the promise
of profitability of the Youngstown facilities was never fulfilled, and
the actions in contract and for detrimental reliance cannot be found
87. Id. at 1270 n.3.
88. Id. at 1270.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1273 (quoting statements made by, among others, David Roderick, C.E.O. of U.S.
Steel).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1266.
94. First, the district court found that none of the statements relied on by the plaintiffs consti-
tuted a definite promise to keep the plant open, even if it did become profitable. Id. at 1277. The
appellate court did not discuss this issue. Second, the statements relied upon were made by public
relations people, not corporate officers, and therefore, were not binding. Id. The appellate court
did not discuss this, either. Third, the condition precedent of the promise, the increased profitabil-
ity, never came about, and the promise was therefore, unenforceable. Id. The court relied heavily
on this argument. Id.
95. Id. The term profitability had to be considered in light of normal corporate accounting
procedures, and using plaintiffs definition would be unreasonable under the circumstances. Id. at
1278-79. The court, in adopting the district court opinion, also expressed its aversion to using its
own view of profitability, rather than that of the corporation. Id. at 1278.
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for plaintiffs." 96 The court, relying on Section 90 of the Restatement
(Second),97 also held that the plaintiffs could not have detrimentally
relied on the promise, as it was not within "reasonable ex-
pectability" for the defendants to keep the plant open under the
plaintiff's definition of profitability.98 In sum, there was no enforcea-
ble promise because a condition precedent to the promise was not
met, reliance on the "promise" would not have been reasonable, and
the court would not order the plant to stay open when economic
necessity mandated its closing.99 Accordingly, the district court de-
cision against the plaintiffs was affirmed.
A similar claim was analyzed in Abbington v. Dayton Malleable,
Incorporated,100 with similar results. In Abbington, a steel produc-
tion facility was faced with heavy losses and a contemplated shut-
down. 10 1 The management conducted a tent meeting near the facil-
ity in order to address the employees.102 Company president
Ladehoff first described the financial difficulties being experienced
by the defendant, and then described the "first of several decisions
that we must make as a company."103 The first option presented was
the closing of the plant in order to bring to a halt the losses being
suffered.10 4 Ladehoff then stated that the second choice was to in-
vest in the facility, modernize it, and convert to producing nodular
96. Id. at 1277. This is the only rationale presented by the trial court which is given due
weight and explicitly endorsed by the Court of Appeals. Note that it assumes the existence of a
valid and enforceable promise.
97. For the text of Section 90, see supra note 69.
98. U.S. Steel, 631 F.2d at 1279. Plaintiffs attempted to define profitability as the "gross
profit margin," which considered only the variable costs of operation in relation to the revenues
generated by the plant. Id. at 1277. The defendants, on the other hand, also factored in the fixed
costs of the operation. Id. These factors, such as depreciation of equipment, selling expenses, ad-
ministrative charges, etc., must be subtracted from the gross profit. Id. The court found this to be
a reasonable business practice for a company operating more than one facility, and under this
calculation, the liabilities of the plants exceeded their assets by a substantial margin. Id. The
court declared itself loathe to substitute its view of profitability for that of a business, and found
the existence of a reasonable basis to determine that the plant was not profitable. Id. at 1277-78.
99. Id. at 1282 (discussing the economic necessity of closing the plant).
100. 561 F. Supp. 1290 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
101. Id. at 1292.
102. Id. at 1293.
103. Id. at 1306. Note that these were oral representations made on a subject already covered
by a written contract, and as such, are prone to difficulties with the parol evidence rule. Id. at
1296; see Michael B. Metzger, The Parol Evidence Rule: Promissory Estoppel's Next Conquest?,
36 VAND. L. REV. 1383, 1437-65 (1983) (discussing the possible extension of the doctrine of
promissory estoppel to override the parol evidence rule).
104. "1 do not want to close this plant, but by the same token I cannot continue with an opera-
tion that loses millions of dollars each year." Abbington, 561 F. Supp. at 1297 (statement of Mr.
Ladehoff, the company president).
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iron. 105 This statement was qualified with the announcement that
such a decision would need to be approved by the board of direc-
tors.106 The meeting was continued with the proviso that the workers
must be willing to make concessions 0 7 in order to win the Board's
approval. Finally, the meeting was concluded with the sentiment
that, "[i]t's not going to be easy for us either, but I'm confident that
with the 4 [sic] points that I've outlined we have at least a chance to
make this plant successful once again."' 0 8
The District Court for the Southern District of Ohio held that the
statements did not constitute a definite promise to continue opera-
tions, nor to modernize the facility.' 09 Additionally, the court re-
viewed various press releases distributed by the company, and found
that they fell into two categories. First, there were those which sim-
ply recited factual information, i.e., the Board's approval of the $5
million investment to convert the plant to nodular iron; the decision
to purchase new equipment; and production goals." 0 The second
group consisted of those statements which were characterized as
merely "'congratulatory' insofar as they comment favorably on em-
ployee enthusiasm for and dedication to efforts to keep the plant
operational.""' Neither category was found to constitute a promise
under the standard enunciated by the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts."' Finally, in a footnote, the court found that even if there
was a promise, there was no detrimental reliance, as required by the
doctrine." 3 Accordingly, the court held the plaintiff's claim under
promissory estoppel was without merit.1 4
In a somewhat analogous case concerning collective bargaining
rather than plant closures, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York found that statements such as
"we're partners," "we look forward to growing together," and a
statement of a "common objective" did not constitute a promise suf-
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Four specific contract modifications were deemed necessary, and were later incorporated
into an agreement, the specifics of which are not significant here. Id.
108. Id. (concluding remarks by company president Ladehoff).
109. Id. The court was not convinced that any of the statements could reasonably be expected
to induce action or forbearance, and thus, were not legally sufficient promises. Id.
110. Id. at 1298.
111. Id.
112. Id. For the text of Section 90 of Restatement (Second), see supra note 69.
113. Abbington, 561 F. Supp. at 1298 n.21.
114. Id. at 1298.
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ficient to support a promissory estoppel claim in Marine Transport
Lines, Inc. v. International Org. of Masters, Mates, & Pilots."5
The statements were made by the plaintiffs during labor negotia-
tions. " 6 The plaintiffs were attempting to convince the defendant
union's members in their employ to agree to wage and benefit reduc-
tions needed for the plaintiffs to retain a Navy contract." 7 In a
counter-claim filed by the defendants, the union asserted that the
plaintiff's statements induced the defendants to make concessions
during collective bargaining in return for the future renewal of a
collective bargaining agreement." 8 In addition to holding the state-
ments insufficient to create the necessary promise," 9 the court found
that this was not a case in which injustice could only be avoided by
enforcement, as required by the Restatement (Second).20 Accord-
ingly, the defendant's counter-claim grounded in promissory estop-
pel was dismissed. 2 '
3. Promissory Estoppel in Michigan
The State of Michigan has long recognized promissory estoppel
"as an equitable remedy . . . employed to alleviate an unjust result
of strict adherence to established legal principles."' 22 The common
law has clearly established the necessary elements through a series
of cases on the subject. 23
115. 636 F. Supp. 384, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
116. Id. at 386.
117. Id. Marine Transport indicated that the Navy Sealift Command would not renew their
contract with Marine Transport unless labor costs were reduced. Id. Marine Transport also in-
formed the union that they believed the loss of the Navy contract would force Marine Transport
into bankruptcy. Id.
118. Id. at 390. The initial claim filed by the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the
collective bargaining agreement between the parties had expired. Id. at 385.
119. The fact that the statements were made by experienced negotiators during the course of
collective bargaining convinced the court that no promise was made. Id. at 391.
120. The court indicated that the Union's own actions brought about the expiration of the
contract, and that it would be unjust to allow them to use equity in order to prevent that expira-
tion. Id.
121. Id.
122. Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., No. 92-43075-CK, 1993 WL
132385, at *11 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Feb. 9, 1993).
123. See Oxley v. Ralston Purina Co., 349 F.2d 328, 334 (6th Cir. 1965) (holding that the
doctrine of equitable estoppel required that oral agreement be enforced); Motobecane Am. Ltd. v.
Patrick Petroleum Co., 600 F. Supp. 1419, 1422 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (holding that more is needed
than merely an alleged promise for estoppel to apply), afid, 791 F.2d 1248 (6th Cir. 1986); State
Bank of Standish v. Curry, 500 N.W.2d 104, 108 (Mich. 1993) (determining that the theory of
promissory estoppel requires that promise is clear and definite); Pursell V. Wolverine-Pentronix,
Inc., 205 N.W.2d 504 (Mich. 1973) (applying equitable estoppel to the statute of frauds); Dumas
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In order for a promise to be enforceable under . . . promissory estoppel,
there must be a (1) promise that the promisor should reasonably have ex-
pected to induce action of a definite and substantial character on the part of
the promise[e], (2) which in fact produced reliance or forbearance of that
nature, (3) in circumstances such that the promise must be enforced if in-
justice is to be avoided.12 4
This was the theory of law for almost twenty years, until a Michi-
gan Supreme Court decision in State Bank of Standish v. Curry115
made various alterations. 12 6
Curry involved a suit by the State Bank of Standish to recover
the collateral for a note on which the Curry's had defaulted. 27 The
Curry's counter-claimed based on promissory estoppel,128 arguing
that the statements made by a bank officer, in conjunction with
prior dealings, amounted to a promise to renew loans the Curry's
had previously received from the bank, thereby allowing them to
continue in the dairy business.2 When the Curry's met with bank
officers to discuss their loans for the current year, the conversation
v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 425 N.W.2d 480, 490 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (setting forth the elements
of promissory estoppel), rev'd on other grounds, 473 N.W.2d 652 (Mich. 1991); Nygard v.
Nygard, 401 N.W.2d 323, 327 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (setting forth the elements of a claim of
promissory estoppel); Schipani v. Ford Motor Co., 302 N.W.2d 307, 310 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981)
(listing elements of a theory of promissory estoppel); McMath v. Ford Motor Co., 259 N.W.2d
140, 142 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (recognizing that promissory estoppel can be invoked to defeat a
defense of the statute of frauds); The Vouge v. Shopping Centers, Inc., 228 N.W.2d 403, 405
(Mich. Ct. App. 1975) (determining that jury should decide question of promissory estoppel);
Association of Hebrew Teachers v. Jewish Welfare Fed'n, 233 N.W.2d 184, 187 (Mich. Ct. App.
1975) (discussing reasoning behind application of theory of promissory estoppel); Timko v. Oral
Roberts Evangelistic Ass'n, 215 N.W.2d 750, 752 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974) (discussing the neces-
sary reliance on the part of the promisee to invoke theory of promissory estoppel).
124. Ypsilanti, No. 92-43075-CK, 1993 WL 132385, at *11 (citing Timko, 215 N.W.2d at
752).
125. 500 N.W.2d 104 (Mich. 1993).
126. Timko was decided in 1974, and Curry in 1993, in the interim between the Ypsilanti trial
court decision and appellate reversal. See infra notes 128-43 and accompanying text (discussing
the breadth and substance of the changes in Michigan promissory estoppel law, as well as the
applicability to the Circuit Court decision).
127. Curry, 500 N.W.2d at 106.
128. Id. The note was for loans the Curry's would need to continue the operation of their dairy
farm. Id. at 105. At the time of the promise, the Curry's were considering a governmental buy out
plan, under which they would sell their herd and cease operations in the dairy business, debt-free.
Id. at 105-06.
129. Beginning in 1975, the Curry's received funds annually from the bank which were used for
the operation of their farm. Id. at 105. Early in each year, they would go to the bank to discuss
their needs, and confer with bank personnel regarding the loan. Id. The bank would then complete
the paperwork, and call the Curry's back to sign the promissory note in March or April. Id. Any
remaining balance from the previous year would be added to the new loan. Id. As collateral, the
bank held a security agreement on all of the Curry's personal property, which was worth at least
twice the value of the loan. Id.
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was held with reference to the possibility that the plaintiffs would
enter a government buy out program'"0 and cease their dairy opera-
tions. 13 1 To this end, Mr. Curry asked if the bank would continue to
support them, should they remain in the business.'3 2 The bank of-
ficers "responded that the Currys were doing a good job and had
made all their payments and [] there was no reason to worry about
their future in the dairy business because the bank would support
them."'3 3 Relying on this promise, the Curry's did not submit a seri-
ous bid to the government program, 34 and when the bank refused to
issue a new loan, the Curry's were forced to default on the note.3 5
In Curry, the Michigan Supreme Court relied on the Restate-
ment's definition of a promise, which "is a manifestation of inten-
tion to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to
justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has been
made."'3 6 The Michigan Supreme Court agreed with the Court of
Appeals that "the sine qua non of the theory of promissory estoppel
is that the promise be clear and definite,' 3 7 and that it must be
distinguished from a statement of opinion or a prediction of future
events.'3 8 In order to determine the existence or scope of a promise,
130. Id. at 106.
Farmers submitted selling bids to the government. If accepted, the government pur-
chased the dairy herd and the farmer agreed not to reenter the dairy business for five
years. If the Currys had submitted such a bid and it had been accepted, the Currys
most likely would have received sufficient compensation to pay their debts and pro-
duce a profit.
Id. at 112 n.1 (Riley, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 106.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. The bid submitted by the Curry's was more than twice as high as the amount they had
determined would be competitive while still providing them with a profit. M. at 106 n.2.
135. Id. at 106.
136. Id. at 108 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 69, § 2). The court also noted that:
[T]he word 'promise' is commonly and quite properly also used to refer to the com-
plex of human relations which results from the promisor's words or acts of assurance,
including the justified expectations of the promisee and any moral or legal duty which
arises to make good the assurance by performance.
Id. at 108 n.7 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 69, § 90 cmt. a). Cf. Charter Township
of Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., No. 92-43075-CK, 1993 WL 132385, at *12 (Mich. Cir.
Ct. Feb. 9, 1993) (providing a somewhat different definition), rev'd, 506 N.W.2d 556 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1993). "The fundamental element of promise seems to be an expression of intention by the
promisor that his future conduct shall be in accordance with his present expression, irrespective of
what his will may be when the time for performance arrives." Id.
137. Curry, 500 N.W.2d at 108. The Court could not, however, agree with the court of appeals
that the promise in this case did not meet that standard. Id.
138. Id. (citing Farber & Matheson, supra note 57, at 933).
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the court should look to the words and actions of the parties, the
nature of the relationship between them, and the facts and circum-
stances surrounding the "promise. ' "9 Additionally, it should be
noted that the Court recognized that a promise may be stated orally
or in writing. " 0 The promise may be in words or inferred wholly or
partially from conduct, considering the course of dealing and per-
formance established between the parties.1 4 ' The entire analysis
must be made under an "objective standard to ascertain whether a
voluntary commitment has been made.' 42 Using this assessment,
the Court found that the proper place for the determination of the
existence of a promise by the bank was with the jury, and reinstated
the verdict for the plaintiffs because it was supported by law." 3
II. SUBJECT OPINION
A. Introduction to the Cases
On February 9, 1993, the Michigan Circuit Court in Washtenaw
County enjoined General Motors Corporation from transferring pro-
duction of Caprice sedans, as well as Buick and Cadillac station
wagons, to any plant other than the Willow Run facility in Ypsi-
lanti, Michigan." This order followed a suit by the Charter Town-
ship of Ypsilanti" 5 brought against GM as a result of a February
1992 announcement that GM intended to transfer automobile as-
sembly operations to a plant in Arlington, Texas." 6 Ypsilanti al-
139. Id. at 109.
140. Id. at 108.
141. Id. (citing Farber & Matheson, supra note 57, at 932).
142. Id. at 109.
143. Id. at 111.
144. Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., No. 92-43075-CK, 1993 WL
132385 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Feb. 9, 1993); rev'd, 506 N.W.2d 556 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993); see Halle
Fine Perrion, Comment, Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp.: The Politics of
Promissory Estoppel Run Amok, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1475 (1993) (arguing that the trial
court's opinion was erroneous).
145. "Washtenaw County joined the suit as a plaintiff and joined in the township contract
theories as a third party beneficiary, as well as asserting a theory of injunctive relief based upon
an alleged violation of the tax abatement statute." Id. at * 1. For a thorough discussion of third
party rights and remedies under promissory estoppel claims, see Michael B. Metzger & Michael
J. Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and Third Parties, 42 Sw. L.J. 931 (1988) [hereinafter Metzger
& Phillips, Third Parties].
The state of Michigan was involuntarily added as a necessary party after the trial court deter-
mined that the State's position (as expressed in an amicus brief filed by the Attorney General)
would be altered by its inclusion. Ypsilanti, No. 92-43075-CK, 1993 WL 132385, at *1.
146. Ypsilanti, No. 92-43075-CK, 1993 WL 132385, at *1.
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leged that GM obtained two twelve year tax abatements on the Wil-
low Run facility by making various agreements with the township,
and that closing Willow Run prior to the end of the abatements
would violate the agreements. 147 The plaintiffs brought forth five
theories for relief, including: 1) breach of a contract created by the
tax abatement statute, 2) breach of a contract created by the con-
duct of the parties before and during the application and approval
process, 3) promissory estoppel, 4) unjust enrichment, and 5)
misrepresentation.1 48
B. Public Act 198 - The Tax Abatement Statute
The tax abatements in question were created under a statute
passed by the Michigan Legislature in 1974149 to draw industries
which "have the reasonable likelihood to create employment, retain
employment, prevent loss of employment, or produce energy in the
community in which the facility is situated."' 150 Known as Public
Act 198, the law involves a two step process. Initially, power lies
exclusively with the municipality, which must create an "industrial
development district," a "plant rehabilitation district," or both.15'
Establishment of the district is completed by a formal resolution of
the local governing body defining the boundaries of the parcel or
parcels of land which constitute the district. 52 After this action is
taken by the municipality, industries may file an application for an
Industrial Exemption Certificate, provided merely that their facility
is located within the zone established by the municipality. 15  The
municipality then conducts a hearing and either approves or denies
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 207.551-.571 (1975). In 1974, Chrysler Corp. was in a desperate
financial situation. Menezes & Morgan, supra note 20, at 140. Poised on the brink of insolvency,
Chrysler threatened to discontinue rehabilitation of its Mack stamping plant in Detroit. Id. at
140-41. This would have resulted in a loss of 5,000 jobs for the community. Id. at 141. Owing to
the poor state of Michigan's economy, legislators determined that a plan was needed which would
encourage Chrysler to invest the capital to protect the jobs in Detroit. Id. Property tax abatement
was seen as the answer, and P.A. 198 passed easily in the state legislature. Ypsilanti, No. 92-
43075-CK, 1993 WL 132385, at *2; Menezes & Morgan, supra note 20, at 141; see Taylor,
supra note 20, at 676-77 (discussing the Michigan statute and the Chrysler Corporation
situation).
150. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 207.559(2)(e) (1975).
151. Id. § 207.554; Menezes & Morgan, supra note 20, at 142.
152. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 207.554(1) (1975); Menezes & Morgan, supra note 20, at 143.




When the application is approved, the second step commences,
and it is sent to the State Tax Commission for further considera-
tion. 55 The State Treasurer and the Department of Commerce pro-
vide their insight to the Tax Commission, 156 who may then grant or
deny the application.' 57 If the municipality denies the application
initially, an appeal process is available to the applicant, and the Tax
Commission may grant approval over the municipality's objec-
tion.' 58 Regardless of the method of approval, the municipality
alone makes the decision as to the length of the abatement, 59
choosing any amount of time less than twelve years.'6 0 This makes
the particular facts and circumstances surrounding each company's
dealings with the local governing body critical.
C. Factual Background Regarding General Motors and
Ypsilanti
Within ninety days of the passing of P.A. 198, General Motors
had organized a group who was ready to seek abatements under the
new statute. 6 ' The pattern established by this group in their deal-
ings with Ypsilanti Township is central to the understanding of this
case, as the pattern was followed for the next fifteen years in ap-
proving a total of eleven separate abatements, worth a combined to-
tal of over $1.3 billion. 162 Following an initial "in-house" meeting
154. Id. at 145. In fact, nearly all of the abatements applied for are granted. Id. at 142.
155. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 207.556 (1975).
156. "If the application would result in abatements which in the aggregate exceed 5% of the
total SEV of the municipality, the State Tax Commission . . . must determine whether its grant-
ing of the certificate would 'substantially impede' the operation of the affected governmental
units." Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., No. 92-43075-CK, 1993 WL
132385, at *2 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Feb. 9, 1993) (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 207.559(1)), rev'd, 506
N.W.2d 556 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
157. Ypsilanti, No. 92-43075-CK, 1993 WL 132385, at *2. "As a practical matter, the State
Tax Commission has never refused to grant an abatement application after the municipality rec-
ommended approval." Id.
158. The state, acting through the Tax Commission, has the power to grant the abatement over
the objection of the municipality, and has in fact done so on a number of occasions. Id. The
rationale behind these decisions is that once the municipality has created the Industrial Develop-
ment District, an eligible applicant has the right to take advantage of the abatement. Id.
159. This gives the municipality the power to limit the operation of the abatement, should it be
granted over their objection through the appeal process. Id. at *3.
160. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 207.566 (1975).
161. Ypsilanti, No. 92-43075-CK, 1993 WL 132385, at *3.
162. Id. at *4. This total reflects abatements for Willow Run, as well as the Hydra-Matic
facility, which is an adjacent plant. Id. at *3. The initial encounter between GM and Ypsilanti in
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for General Motors staff, the corporation invited select members
from the township's officers to meet for an "informal workshop."16
GM then held another internal meeting in order to determine what
information needed to be revealed to the Township. 64 After making
their conclusion, GM held a meeting with the entire Ypsilanti
Township Board,' 6 which was followed by a tour of the plant and
lunch.'66 After formally filing an application, General Motors met
with various school districts in the area to explain the purpose of the
Act, and alleviate fears that the tax abatement would lead to a de-
crease in the amount of tax revenue available to the schools.1 67
Shortly thereafter, "the Ypsilanti Township Board voted unani-
mously in favor of. . . [the] application . . . [which] received final
approval by the State of Michigan."' 168
In 1981, as GM sought another of the P.A. 198 abatements, one
of the township trustees'69 expressed concern that General Motors
the Act 198 context concerned an abatement for Hydra-Matic, but the same procedure and course
of dealing were followed regardless of which facility GM was seeking the abatement. Id. at *5.
163. Id. at *3. General Motors stated:
The purpose of the meeting was the discussion of Public Act 198 with the representa-
tives of the Township and to advise them of our intentions to file an application ....
A review was made of Public Act 198 explaining the reason for the Act which was to
increase jobs or maintain employment levels in Michigan and encourage business to
invest in new plants and equipment. A review of our plant operations . . . was also
given. Also at this meeting it was agreed that further discussion must be held with the
entire Ypsilanti Township Board who must finally act on our application from a local
level.
Id.
164. This information was determined to be proprietary, as it involved future project costs and
new product lines, but it was deemed necessary to be relayed to Ypsilanti in order to comply with
the statutory provisions. Id.
165. The content of the meeting included a history of plant operations, aerial photographs of
the plant and its surrounding properties, discussion of current business level, past employment
figures, projected future employment figures, contemplated changes in the automobile market, and
the impact of such changes on the employment at the plant. Id. at *4. There was also a discussion
of the importance of P.A. 198, and how it related to future production and employment at the
facility. Id. Finally, the proposed rehabilitation and rearrangement of the plant were examined.
Id.
166. Id.
167. "No concern was given on behalf of any of these administrators." Id.
168. Id.
Approval of that application was the first of what turned out to be eleven approved
applications for tax abatements on the two plants over the next fifteen years. Ypsilanti
Township was among the first municipalities in the State to create an industrial devel-
opment district . . . State-wide, General Motors has been one of the most frequent
recipients of [Public] Act 198 subsidies, having received 122 such abatements on its
various Michigan facilities.
Id.
169. He was Wesley Prater, later to become Township Supervisor. Id. at *5.
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was not committed to maintaining employment levels in Ypsi-
lanti.170 The plant manager replied with a letter to the entire Board,
reading in part:
The purpose of this letter is to reassure you that it is not our intention to
transfer production operations to other Hydra-Matic Division plant loca-
tions; the net affect [sic] of which would have a negative impact on the
employment levels at our Ypsilanti location. In this case, as in the past, we
are dedicated to retain and/or increase jobs at Ypsilanti and will maintain
this dedication in the future. We intend to keep this facility a viable opera-
tion for the community and General Motors.
1 7
'
The specific abatements at issue in this case, granted in 1984 and
1988, followed the course of conduct detailed above.'7 2 The 1984
abatement was sought in relation to a modification of the Willow
Run Plant to produce "H" model cars .17  The application indicated
that GM expected the change to create 200 new jobs, and retain
4,300 jobs already in existence. 17 Unfortunately, the public reaction
to "H" cars was less than favorable,' 75 and GM subsequently de-
cided to produce a new rear-wheel drive "B" version of the Caprice






175. Id. at *6. The demise of the "H-Car" can be attributed to two factors, its styling, and its
antiquated platform. Interview with Jason Reyes, Automotive Consultant, Car and Driver Mag.,
in Chicago, 111. (Dec. 28, 1994). During the late 1970's and early '80's, while the competition in
economy class cars grew, the market was penetrated by technologically advanced, fuel efficient
vehicles from around the world. Id. Rather than update the H car, GM fought back with new
models. Id. Accordingly, today's Caprice is no more technologically advanced than it was when it
was introduced in 1979. Id. To make matters worse, the recent "re-skin" of the old platform was
an aesthetic failure. Id. Automotive critics are unanimous in their dislike for the new appearance.
Id. "The Caprice likely failed because it looks like a whale, and with its antiquated platform, it
drives like one too." Id.
176. "Importantly, the decision to make this investment in Willow Run was made before Gen-
eral Motors pursued or even investigated the possibility of an Act 198 tax abatement for the
proposed improvements." Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., No. 92-43075-
CK, 1993 WL 132385, at *6 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Feb. 9, 1993), rev'd, 506 N.W.2d 556 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1993). The court found that the decision to invest in Willow Run was widely known to the
public, and had been detailed in the local media before the township was ever approached by GM.
Id. The court stated that it appeared GM simply assumed that this abatement would be issued
pursuant to the party's prior course of conduct, and that the facts indicated that "General Motors
was going to invest in Willow Run regardless of the township's reaction to the tax abatement
application and the township knew it." Id. This becomes relevant, in that "the 1988 abatement
was not intended by either General Motors or Ypsilanti Township to be an inducement to make
the investment in the plant which was the subject of the application." Id.
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not produce new jobs, GM claimed that it would retain 4,900 ex-
isting jobs.1 " At the hearing to determine the acceptability of Gen-
eral Motor's application for an abatement relating to the new pro-
duction, several key statements were made. Mr. Harvey Williams
read a prepared statement on behalf of General Motors 17 8 which
concluded with the assertion, "[u]pon completion of this project and
favorable market demand, it will allow Willow Run to continue pro-
duction and maintain continuous employment for our employees. 17 9
Mr. Russel Hughes, the resident comptroller, followed with a brief
presentation explaining that GM's decreasing market share resulted
in loss of production jobs at plants throughout the United States.1 80
He also described the situation at Willow Run as stable over the
preceding several years, and commented that GM had been main-
taining a consistent pattern with about 5,000 employees at the facil-
ity. 81 Mr. Williams then concluded by asking the Board to "join
the corporation in the kind of relationship we have in . . .assuring
future investments in our Plant. 182
The Township Assessor made his recommendation for approval to
the Board in what the courts considered an extremely important
fashion. "Based on the past history in dealing with the people of
General Motors[,] they've always done what they said they would
do and they've kept the jobs there and they've kept the plant operat-
ing . . . ."' After hearing both sides, the Board unanimously ap-
proved the applications for the maximum twelve years authorized by
statute.184 Following Ypsilanti's approval, the State Tax Commis-
sion asked for the county's position on the matter. The county indi-
177. Id. at *7 (quoting section 10 of the abatement application).
178. General Motors attempted to claim that no one below the level of chief executive officer of
the corporation could make such a binding statement. Id. at *14 n.47. The court found this not to
be true, as the statement had been reviewed by corporate headquarters. I. Additionally, and
embarrassingly for GM, similar binding commitments had been made in other states by lower
level officials. Id.
179. Id. at *7. Mr. Hughes, the Willow Run Comptroller, prepared the statements, as well as
graphs and charts for presentation to the Board at a public hearing suggested by Wesley Prater to
"educate" new members of the Board, as recent elections brought in new members who had not
dealt with GM in the past. Id. at *6-7.
180. Id. at *7.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. (tending to show the strong reliance placed on past dealings and course of performance
by the Township, thereby making reliance on this alleged promise reasonable).
184. There were two abatements being applied for concurrently, one for Willow Run, and one
for Hydra-Matic. Id. at *8.
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cated that it would support local unit decisions, provided there was
compliance with "both the spirit and the letter of the law." 18' The
State Tax Commission then approved the application, and another
abatement was granted to GM. 186
By late 1991, demand for Caprice automobiles was so low that
GM decided to close down one of its Caprice production plants.
87
After considering "proposals" from the municipalities which could
be affected by the shut-down, namely Ypsilanti, Michigan, and Ar-
lington, Texas, and the plants located in each of those communities,
GM provided the notice required by the federal WARN Act, 188
closed Willow Run, and transferred production to the Arlington fa-
cility.189 The Charter Township of Ypsilanti promptly brought suit
against GM in an attempt to enjoin the transfer, or alternatively,
recover money damages.' 90
D. The Trial Court's Opinion
The trial court began its analysis in Charter Township of Ypsi-
lanti v. General Motors Corp. by examining the possibility that the
tax abatement statute could have created contractual obligations.' 9'
After determining that the legislature could have created a con-
tract, "'92 the court found that it did not,' 93 and admonished the Leg-
185. Id. The county adopted this resolution prior to the application for the abatements in ques-
tion, and it appears their position was the same for both the 1984 and 1988 abatements. Id.
186. "On August 7, 1989, the tax commission . ..issued an Industrial Facilities Exemption
Certificate for the period 'beginning December 30, 1989 and ending December 30, 2003.'" Id.
(citing Plaintiff's Township Ex. 4-9).
187. Id. GM had a plant in Arlington, Texas which was running two shifts per day, while
Willow Run maintained one shift per day. Id.
188. Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 2102 (1988).
189. Ypsilanti, v. No. 92-43075-CK, 1993 WL 132385, at *8.
190. Id. at *1.
191. No. 92-43075-CK, 1993 WL 132385 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Feb. 9, 1993), rev'd, 506 N.W.2d
556 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
192. The court found that a state may create a binding contract with an industry receiving a
subsidy, pursuant to the United States Supreme Court decision in Indiana ex rel Anderson v.
Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 99 (1935). Id. at *9.
193. The court focused its inquiry on the statute itself, as well as the cases and administrative
decisions interpreting it. Id. at *8-11. Because the Act never used the term "contract," or other
similar language, which would show an intent on the part of the Legislature to make a mutually
binding -agreement, there was no enforceable contract. Id. at *9. Additionally, contractual reme-
dies were not provided for in the statute, further indicating the lack of intent for the parties to be
bound. Id. The Township focused on specific language found on the abatement application, assert-
ing that the use of the word "will" in section 10(a) in relation to providing continuous or increased
employment created a contract. The court held that the language of the statute must ultimately
control over the interpretation of the administrative agency in charge of creating the application.
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islature for the lack of foresight. 194 The court then moved on to the
promissory estoppel claim, and the heart of the opinion. After de-
claring that the "[a]pplication of the doctrine of promissory estoppel
is based on the particular factual circumstances; as an equitable
remedy, it is employed to alleviate an unjust result of strict adher-
ence to established legal principles,"' 95 the court went on to describe
the elements necessary for the enforcement of a promissory estoppel
claim under Michigan common law.' 96 The doctrine requires (1) a
"promise that the promisor should reasonably have expected to in-
duce action of a definite and substantial character on the part of the
promise[e], (2) which in fact produced reliance or forbearance of
that nature, (3) in circumstances such that the promise must be en-
forced if injustice is to be avoided."' 97 Ypsilanti claimed that GM
represented that they would provide continuous employment at Wil-
low Run for as long as the municipality provided tax abatements. 198
Ypsilanti also claimed that this representation, coupled with Mr.
Williams' statement at the public hearing, 99 qualified as a promise
deserving enforcement under the equitable doctrine. °
Id. at *10.
194.
This Court's conclusion that the legislature did not, when it enacted Act 198, intend
to impose contractual obligations on subsidized industries is not something of which
the State should be proud. The relationship of government and industry in this coun-
try is necessarily one of conflict, for it is the purpose of government to provide for the
common welfare of all and it is the antithetical purpose of an industry to strive solely
for the profit of its owners. For example, contrary to the approach of the defendant in
this case that "what is good for General Motors is good for the country," the truth is,
as this case demonstrates, that what is good for General Motors may only coinciden-
tally help, and often hurts, many of our people. . . . The tax abatement statutes in
this State and others are not the product of a well thought out effort to forge . . . a
new partnership [between industry and the government]. This tax subsidy policy re-
sults in pitting state against state and municipality against municipality in an inter-
governmental bidding war. The local governments of this State are placed in a posi-
tion where they feel that they have no choice but to give taxpayers' resources away
under a statute which does not mandate that they receive anything in return for those
foregone taxes.
Id. at *10 (footnote omitted).
195. Id. at *11.
196. The court stated that the elements have been clearly identified in Michigan case law, and
cites a number of prior decisions, with Dumas v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 425 N.W.2d 480 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1988) being the most recent. Id.; see id. at *11 n.42 (citing the decisions).
197. Id. at *11.
198. Id. Representations were made through a repeated pattern of inducement for abatements,
and the fact that GM had always provided the jobs in the past. Id.
199. See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text (discussing the statement of Mr.
Williams).
200. Ypsilanti. No. 92-43075-CK, 1993 WL 132385, at *11.
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Regarding the first element, the court provided a legal definition
of the word promise, stating, "[t]he fundamental element of [a]
promise seems to be an expression of intention by the promisor that
his future conduct shall be in accordance with his present expres-
sion, irrespective of what his will may be when the time for per-
formance arrives."201 The court ruled that the statement made by
GM indicating that the granting of an abatement would enable GM
to provide continuous employment at the plant was the type of quid
pro quo remark that would naturally be associated with a prom-
ise.210 Additionally, the court noted that "[i]n the context of the
abatement application hearing[,] the statement was also a promise
that General Motors 'should reasonably have expected to induce ac-
tion of a definite and substantial character on the part of' the town-
ship." 8 GM was attempting to induce Ypsilanti to cut the property
taxes in half on a $75 million project, and the court relied on the
fact that the decision to invest in the Willow Run facility was made
and publicized prior to the seeking of the abatement. 04 "The only
logical reason the township would have to give up half of the taxes
on the project is that General Motors represented, as it had done in
the past, that as long as it made those cars it was going to make
them in Willow Run. 20 5
General Motors countered by arguing that if a promise existed, it
was conditioned on "favorable market demand," and therefore illu-
sory and unenforceable. 20 6 GM argued that their promise was condi-
tioned on market demand for Caprice automobiles sufficient to keep
Willow Run and the Arlington, Texas plant running two shifts per





206. GM based this claim on the fact that Mr. Williams' statement included the phrase
"favorable market demand." Id. Mr. Williams testified at trial that he meant to indicate that the
Willow Run facility would only be maintained for as long as there was sufficient demand to keep
both the Ypsilanti and Arlington, Texas plants open and running two shifts per day. Id. The court
rejected this argument, indicating that the Arlington plant had never been mentioned during any
discussions of the abatement, and that the credibility of such testimony was suspect, coming as it
did nearly five years after the fact and in the context of a trial over the transfer to the Arlington
facility. Id. The court stressed the need for an objective test to determine intent, which disembow-
eled GM's allegation that they intended Willow Run's continued activity to depend on the level of
production at Arlington. Id. For an argument that reliance on illusory promises is sufficient to
allow enforcement of a promise, see Metzger & Phillips, Reliance, supra note 59, at 886-902.
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day, 235 days per year. 7 The court held that the intent of the par-
ties must be determined based on an objective view of the expressed,
not unexpressed, words of the speaker.2 0 8 Because no mention of the
Arlington plant had been made during the public hearing on the tax
abatement in question, nor had any mention of Arlington work
levels been discussed with township officials, and because the testi-
mony regarding the "proper" interpretation of that phrase came
nearly five years after the statement was made, in the context of
litigation over the transfer to Arlington, the court was not persuaded
that the promise was truly conditional.2 0 9 The court then ruled that
"General Motors' statement clearly meant that if there was a suffi-
cient market demand to make the Caprice and the station wagons
they would be made at Willow Run."'2 10 This finding satisfied the
first requirement, a promise reasonably expected to induce action,
for a promissory estoppel claim to be successful.
The second element in promissory estoppel is the "promise pro-
duced 'reliance or forbearance' of a definite and substantial charac-
ter," which the court found almost without discussion.211 Noting
that the township surrendered over $2 million in local taxes for the
1988-1992 period alone,212 the court felt it was unnecessary to ex-
amine any of the other evidence of reliance. 213 The final element of
a promissory estoppel claim is the requirement that injustice may
only be avoided by enforcement of the promise. 21 ' The court distin-
guished prior cases which refused to enjoin plant closures using
promissory estoppel because those cases did not involve tax abate-
ments, and also because the shut-downs were justified by economic
necessity. 5 The judge in this case, in deciding how to use his equity
207. Ypsilanti, 1993 WL 132385, at *12 (testimony of Harvey Williams).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at *13. There was still a demand for the cars at the time of the transfer, GM merely





215. Id. (discussing Local 1330, United Steel Workers of Am. v. United States Steel Corp.,
631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980); Abbington v. Dayton Malleable, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 1290 (S.D.
Ohio 1983)); see infra notes 332-57 and accompanying text (providing a detailed comparison of
those cases to the Ypsilanti facts and decisions). Note that the parties in this case stipulated that
economic necessity was not a justification for the closing of the Willow Run facility. Ypsilanti,
No. 92-43075-CK, 1993 WL 132385, at *13.
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powers," 6 "simply f[ound] that the failure to act in this case would
result in a terrible injustice and that the doctrine of promissory es-
toppel should be applied."2 7
There would be a gross inequity and patent unfairness if General Motors,
having lulled the people of the Ypsilanti area into giving up millions of tax
dollars which they so desperately need to educate their children and provide
basic governmental services, is allowed to simply decide that it will desert
4500 workers and their families because it thinks it can make these same
cars a little cheaper somewhere else.""
The court then enjoined GM from transferring production from
Willow Run to any other facility.219 General Motors appealed.
E. The Appellate Court Opinion
The Court of Appeals of Michigan began their opinion in Charter
Township of Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp.220 with a brief re-
statement of the case, and the trial court's findings of fact.2"1 The
court then discussed the standard of review for findings of fact in an
equity action.222 The court held that in order to be reviewable, the
findings must be clearly erroneous.223 Clearly erroneous means that
"the appellate court [must be] left with a definite and firm convic-
216. Judge Shelton, commenting on his responsibility to make a determination of the equities in
the case, stated as follows:
[T]his court, perhaps unlike the judges [in the other plant closure cases], simply finds
that the failure to act in this case would result in a terrible injustice and that the
doctrine of promissory estoppel should be applied. Each judge who dons this robe
assumes the awesome, and lonely, responsibility to make decisions about justice, and
injustice, which will dramatically affect the way people are forced to live their lives.
Every such decision must be the judge's own and it must be made honestly and in
good conscience. There would be a gross inequity and patent unfairness if General
Motors, having lulled the people of the Ypsilanti area into giving up millions of tax
dollars which they so desperately need to educate their children and provide basic
governmental services, is allowed to simply decide that it will desert 4500 workers and
their families because it thinks it can make these same cars a little cheaper some-
where else. Perhaps another judge in another court would not feel moved by that
injustice and would labor to find a legal rationalization to allow such conduct. But in
this court it is my responsibility to make that decision. My conscience will not allow
this injustice to happen.
Ypsilanti, 1993 WL 132385, at *13.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at *14.
220. 506 N.W.2d 556 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
221. Id. at 557-58.




tion that a mistake has been made."22 The court then integrated
the elements for a promissory estoppel claim with the standard of
review and indicated that what is required is "an actual, clear, and
definite promise, ' " 5 combined with reliance that is "'reasonable
only if it is induced by an actual promise.' A determination that
there was a promise will be overturned if it is clearly erroneous. ' 226
The appellate court held that the trial court's finding of a promise
was clearly erroneous. 2 This determination was based first on the
court's holding that the solicitation of an abatement, combined with
assurances of jobs, cannot be evidence of a promise 2 The fact that
the purpose of the tax abatement statute was to induce companies to
locate and/or continue production in particular communities was
deemed to bolster this decision. 2 9
Another factor deemed to mitigate against the existence of a
promise was that "representations of job creation and retention are
a statutory prerequisite." 230 Finally, relying on precedent, the court
stated, "the fact that a manufacturer uses hyperbole and puffery in
seeking an advantage or concession does not necessarily create a
promise. 231 The court described statements made in Marine Trans-
port Lines, Incorporated,3 2 Abbington v. Dayton Malleable, Incor-
porated,83 and Local 1330 v. U.S. Steel,23 4 and then turned to ex-
amine the statements made in the case at bar.235
The court ruled that the statements relied on by the plaintiffs
224. Id. at 559 (citing, Beason v. Beason, 460 N.W.2d 207, 212-13 (Mich. 1990)).
225. Id.
226. Id. (citing State Bank of Standish v. Curry, 500 N.W.2d 104, 107 (Mich. 1993) (citations
omitted)). Note that the Curry decision was handed down by the Michigan Supreme Court after





230. Id. The court did not elaborate on this point, other than to cite statutory language sup-
porting the proposition that assurances of jo6 creation or retention are required. Id. (citing MICH.
COMp. LAWS § 207.559(2)(e) (1975)).
231. Id. (citing Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. United States Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264
(6th Cir. 1980); Marine Transport Lines, Inc. v. International Org. of Masters, Mates, and Pilots,
636 F. Supp. 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Abbington v. Dayton Malleable, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 1290
(S.D. Ohio 1983), affd, 738 F.2d 438 (6th Cir. 1984)).
232. See supra notes 115-21 and accompanying text (discussing the decision in Marine
Transport).
233. See supra notes 100-14 and accompanying text (discussing Abbington).
234. See supra notes 86-99 and accompanying text (discussing Local 1330).




were merely GM's expressions of their hopes or expectations of con-
tinued employment at Willow Run, rather than promises.2 3  The
course of conduct evidence was minimized by indicating that it only
showed efforts to take advantage of the statutory opportunity
presented by P.A. 198.237 The acts relied on by the trial court as
evidence of a promise were described as only those "one would natu-
rally expect a company to do in order to introduce and promote an
abatement proposal to a municipality. "23 8 The court also noted that
much of the evidence presented by the plaintiffs related to abate-
ments sought for Hydra-Matic, rather than Willow Run.23 9
The appellate court asserted that GM should be given the abate-
ment because "[b]ased on the past history . . ., they've always done
what they said they would do and they've kept the jobs there and
they kept the plant operating.1 240 The court determined that a state-
ment made by the township assessor could not be used as evidence
of a promise, because it was the assessor's evaluation, rather than
the defendant's promise.2 41 The court also dismissed the State Tax
Commission resolution which predicated approval of the abatement
on retained or increased employment in the county as the commis-
sion's expectation, not the defendant's promise. Mr. Hughes, who
provided information regarding the effect of loss of market share by
GM on national employment levels at the public hearing, made a
statement regarding GM's consistent pattern of employment at Wil-
low Run. 43 This was found to have been made by way of history,
and not as a statement of future intent.2  Finally, the court analo-
gized the statements made by General Motors representative Har-
vey Williams to the "puffery" which was found not to constitute a
promise by a federal court in Marine Transport Lines, Incorpo-
rated.2 45 The court held that no actual, clear, and definite promise





241. See supra note 169 and accompanying text (identifying the township assessor as Wesley
Prater and discussing his comments at the public hearing).
242. Ypsilanti, 506 N.W.2d at 560.
243. "Since the '81, '82 time-frame you can see that we've been basically maintaining about
five thousand employees each year in a very consistent pattern." Id.
244. Id.




had been made, and that even if one could be found, the reliance
upon it was not reasonable. 46
Citing statements made by some of the many members of the
general public who attended the hearing and protested the lack of
commitment by General Motors,247 the court concluded that there
was a general understanding that GM was not promising anything
in return for the abatement.2 4 8 Because no clarification or response
to these concerns was requested from defendant's representatives,
and the Board proceeded to approve the application, 4 9 the court
held "the resolution contained no suggestion that approval was con-
ditioned on a commitment to operate the plant for any particular
period."25 The Court of Appeals of Michigan then held that no
promise had been made, reversed the decision of the trial court, and
allowed General Motors to transfer production away from Willow
Run and out of Ypsilanti for good.251
III. ANALYSIS
A. Use of Tax Abatements
The use of tax abatements as an economic incentive to draw in
and retain businesses and industries for a particular area is an inef-
fective governmental tool. 25 2 This can be attributed in part to the
minor role tax abatements play in a company's location decision.2 58
The importance of abatements is limited because the other costs of
doing business greatly outweigh local and state tax burdens.2 5' Ad-
246. Ypsilanti, 506 N.W.2d at 561.
247. Dillard Craiger, chairman of the Washtenaw County Board of Commissioners, opposed
granting the abatement "unless a commitment was made by General Motors to remain operat-
ing." Id. Craiger also complained that GM had not made any firm commitment. Id. Mr. Smith, a
member of the audience and an 18-year employee of GM, commented that he would like to see
the company stay until he could retire, "but they are not promising anything." Id. at 562. Finally,
Mr. Debs, president of the local union, said, "'nobody can tell us what the sales are going to be'"
and "'no plant can stay open' if sales drop." Id.
248. Id. at 562; see supra note 247 (detailing the statements made by the public on which the
appellate court relied).
249. Ypsilanti, 506 N.W.2d at 561.
250. Id. at 562.
251. Id.
252. See supra notes 39-54 and accompanying text (discussing the limited role tax abatements
play in corporate location decisions).
253. See supra notes 39-54 and accompanying text.
254. For the average business, taxes are less than 4% of the value added. In comparison, en-
ergy costs constitute 8%, and labor costs can rise as high as 60% of the value added. NORTHEAST
MIDWEST INSTITUTE, THE GUIDE TO STATE AND FEDERAL RESOURCES FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOP-
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ditionally, state and local taxes are deductible from federal taxes,
further reducing the net worth of an abatement and discounting its
value in location decisions. 55
The influence of non-tax factors was clearly exemplified during
recent competition between thirty-seven states for GM's proposed
Saturn production plant.256 Over 1000 sites throughout the country
battled each other to show GM that they were the best location for
the nearly $6 billion investment and 6000 new jobs.257 The State of
Michigan stated their "intent to exceed any offer" 258 made by other
communities, yet it was eliminated from consideration by GM be-
cause of the high utility and workers compensation costs in the
state. 59 In the end, "[t]ransportation considerations emerged as the
single largest factor in the decision-making process. 12 60 The focus
on non-tax factors in making a relocation decision in Ypsilanti was
nearly analogous.
In attempting to choose between Willow Run and Arlington, GM
never considered the granting of the tax abatements by Ypsilanti an
important factor. For example, in a twelve-page company confiden-
tial plant comparison, General Motors never once referred to abate-
ments or tax considerations as a relevant factor in deciding between
Ypsilanti and Arlington.26 1 The closest possible allusion was a com-
ment that Willow Run provided a lower unit cost, which presumably
factored in the generous tax break provided to the company. 62 De-
spite the lower unit cost, and other clear advantages to continued
production of Willow Run, GM chose the Arlington facility. The
influence of non-tax factors obviously greatly outweighed any im-
pact the abatement could have had on the decision-making process.
Because tax abatements are generally seen by companies as a non-
factor in location decisions, they are an ineffective tool for munici-
MENT 233-34 (C. Bartsch ed., 1988).
255. Richard D. Pomp, The Role of State Tax Incentives in Attracting and Retaining Busi-
ness: A View From New York, 29 TAX NOTES 521, 523 (1985).
256. See Kolesar, supra note 18, at 289-91 (providing a case study of the Saturn experience to
illustrate the role of economic incentives in location decisions).
257. Id. at 289.
258. Id. at 290.
259. Id. (comparing to rival bidders Kentucky and Tennessee). In the final analysis, transporta-
tion concerns emerged as the most important factor in the decision-making process. Id. at 290-91.
260. Id.
261. Application of Charter Township of Ypsilanti for Leave to Appeal and for Expedited Con-
sideration Thereof (Appendix E, B/D Plant Platform Consolidation), Ypsilanti v. General Motors
Co., 506 N.W.2d 556 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (No.161245).
262. Id. at 11.
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palities seeking to increase or retain industry and business in their
communities. Unless companies are legally obligated to remain in
the granting community in return for an abatement, tax abatements
will continue to play an insignificant role in the allocation of produc-
tive resources.
Compounding the problems associated with tax abatements, gov-
erning bodies caught up in the abatement process can be dragged
down in the "race to the bottom."263 When companies can get dif-
ferent localities to engage in a "bidding war" to offer the greatest
possible incentives, the results can be disastrous. Because state and
local governments are subject to extreme competitive pressures in
the struggle to attract and retain capital, they will often feel obli-
gated to comply with company coercion aimed at increasing the in-
centives. 6 In a striking example of how economic pressures can
force concessions, union members in Arlington and Ypsilanti turned
on one another in an attempt to persuade GM that theirs was the
superior plant. By offering greater and greater compromises, the lo-
cal unions hoped to sway GM's decision concerning the location of
production of Caprice automobiles. 65
The negative impact of "the race to the bottom" is produced in
part by loss of revenue for the community. Less tax dollars are
263. See supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text (describing the harmful consequences of the
race to the bottom).
264. The political pressure on legislators to maintain the appearance of actively recruiting busi-
ness for their constituency will sometimes lead to the offering of economic incentives regardless of
long-term repercussions. However, communities do not always bow to the pressure. Lansing,
Michigan denied GM a requested tax break, despite suggestions that the break was needed if GM
was to expand its operations. Kolesar, supra note 18, at 308. GM stayed in Lansing without the
requested relief. Id.
265.
General Motors Corp. in effect pitted unionized workers against one another when it
said it would close down either a plant in Arlington, Texas, or one in Ypsilanti,
Mich[igan]. The 3,200 Arlington workers put cooperation with GM ahead of UAW
fellowship, voting to allow a three-shift schedule to build cars round the clock without
overtime pay, and approving other work-rule changes. Workers in Ypsilanti didn't
offer GM much, and their plant is now set to close next year.
Dana Milbank, On the Ropes: Unions' Woes Suggest How the Labor Force in U.S. is Shifting,
WALL ST. J., May 5, 1992, at Al, A14.
"'We feel betrayed by our Arlington UAW brothers and sisters,'" said a Willow Run union
member referring to the battle between the plants to remain open by offering concessions to GM.
David Morrow, Ypsi. Texas Town in GM Survival Duel; Jobs $100 Million Plant Hinge on
Outcome, DET. FREE PREss, Dec. 21, 1991, at Al. For an argument that this type of conduct is
inappropriate, and that the National Labor Relations Act was designed to and should protect
worker solidarity, see David Abraham, Individual Autonomy and Collective Empowerment in
Labor Law: Union Membership Resignations and Strikebreaking in the New Economy, 63 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1268, 1273 (1988).
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taken in, while operating costs for governmental services increase.2 6
The loss in revenue and increased strain on service providers can
result in a corresponding decrease in the quality and availability of
governmental services, as well as a degradation of infrastructure.26
Not only can this diminish the quality of life for the community's
residents, it can lead to the loss of the very business who received
the abatement. If the abatement grantee is not legally bound to the
community, it may decide that the decrease in quality or quantity of
services or decaying infrastructure outweighs the benefit of the
abatement, and that relocation would be in their best interest.2 68
The community would then be left to deal with the side effects of
decreased revenue, without the production facility they made the
sacrifices for in the first place.
As stated earlier, tax abatements are not a major influence in a
company's location decision.2 69 Nor will a community necessarily
benefit by granting abatements in order to draw in business or in-
dustry. This dichotomy, combined with a statute that does not re-
quire a business to provide assurances of continued production or
employment, places communities like Ypsilanti in a difficult predic-
ament. The community feels obligated to offer the incentives to
draw in or maintain businesses, but fears the repercussions of a
hasty departure. This is especially true in a case like Ypsilanti,
when the community and business have a long-standing relationship
where the use of abatements has been mutually beneficial. Still,
they face the possibility of a major catastrophe should the business
withdraw. If the statute granting the community the power to offer
abatements is not sufficient to bind the company to uphold represen-
tations made in order to get the abatement, the law must devise a
method of enforcement. Promissory estoppel has the ability to rise
to the task.
B. Promissory Estoppel and Plant Closures
Promissory estoppel is an evolving and expanding doctrine, which
allows for application in many settings.2 70 It is used as a method of
266. See supra note 48-54 and accompanying text (discussing the "costs" of tax abatements).
267. Kolesar, supra note 18, at 295-96.
268. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 29-31 accompanying text (discussing the myriad factors that outweigh the
value of a tax abatement in many company relocation decisions).
270. See supra notes 55-84 and accompanying text (discussing the expansion of promissory
estoppel and its uses).
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imposing liability and expectation damages in cases where the
promisor apparently intended to be legally bound," 1 though en-
forcement would be doubtful on traditional contract grounds owing
to the absence of a clear bargain.272 "[P] romissory estoppel seems to
reflect a judgment that formal requirements too often lead to results
at odds with the reasonable intentions and expectations of con-
tracting parties. 2 7a The goal of the law should be to protect the
ability of individuals to trust in promises where trust is essential,
and promissory estoppel was developed to accomplish that end.2 7
The application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel to prevent
plant closures in situations where tax abatements were granted in
reliance on representations made by the grantee is wholly appropri-
ate. Trust is essential when a community is preparing to forebear
collection of a substantial amount of tax revenue in the hopes of
increasing their business/industrial base. Accordingly, promissory
estoppel is an ideal solution for problems arising in that context.
Promissory estoppel may rightfully be invoked, provided its elements
are met by the plaintiff, in order to enjoin the recipient of a tax
abatement from deserting the granting community before the abate-
ment period has expired.
C. Application of Promissory Estoppel in the Ypsilanti case
1. The Promise
In determining whether promissory estoppel could be used to pre-
271. "[C]ourts award and uphold expectation damages [on promissory estoppel claims] when
they find that a promise exists, when the promisor gained an economic advantage from the prom-
isee, and when the parties' relationship is 'ongoing rather than in the context of a discrete transac-
tion.'" Brief of Amicus Curiae at 21, Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., 506 N.W.2d 556 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1993) (No. 161245) (quoting Farber & Matheson, supra note 57, at 925). "[A]ny prom-
ise made in furtherance of an economic activity is enforceable." Farber & Matheson, supra note
57, at 905. Where the elements of reasonable reliance, economic benefit to the promisor, inequal-
ity of status and knowledge, and differing levels of commitment to the underlying transaction are
present, an award of expectation damages is appropriate under promissory estoppel. Feinman,
Promissory Estoppel, supra note 57, at 314.
272. Mary E. Becker, Promissory Estoppel Damages, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 131, 140-42
(1987). The article posits that expectation damages are appropriate despite the lack of a clear
indication of a bargained-for promise in three situations: "when consideration is clearly bargained-
for[,] to protect the promisee's restitution and reliance interests, and [where] judicial preferences
may favor full enforcement." Id. at 141.
273. Randy E. Barnett & Mary E. Becker, Beyond Reliance: Promissory Estoppel, Contract
Formalities, and Misrepresentations, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 443, 449 (1987).
274. State Bank of Standish v. Curry, 500 N.W.2d 104, 107 (Mich. 1993) (referring to Farber
& Matheson, supra note 57, at 928, 942).
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vent the closure of Willow Run, the court of appeals erred by disre-
garding the Michigan Supreme Court's instructions regarding the
proper application of the doctrine in State Bank of Standish v.
Curry.276 Curry does hold, as the appeals court indicated, that
"[p]romissory estoppel requires an actual, clear, and definite prom-
ise. . . . [and that] 'reliance is reasonable only if it is induced by an
actual promise.' "276 The error made by the court is the failure to
follow Curry's instructions on how to determine the existence of
such a promise. Rather than base a decision solely on the statement
"[w]e'll support you," made from a bank to a loan recipient, 7 the
Michigan Supreme Court also looked to the long history of relations
between the parties.
Year after year, Mr. Curry would go to the bank with his finan-
cial statements to discuss the upcoming crop and the resulting nec-
essary loan.2 78 The bank would fill out the paperwork and call the
Currys later in the year to come to the bank and sign the promis-
sory note for their loan. 27 '9 At the initial meeting between the parties
during the year in question, the conversation focused on the hard
economic times, and the possibility that the Currys would get out of
the dairy business.2 80 The bank indicated that the Currys were do-
ing a good job fulfilling the bank's expectations, and that the bank
would continue to support them in the business if they decided to
continue.2 "8 This combination of course of conduct and a vague
statement of intent was found to constitute a promise sufficient to be
reasonably relied on by the Currys 82 The situation between Ypsi-
lanti and General Motors was nearly identical.
In Ypsilanti,2 83 General Motors would draw up its financial state-
ments and proposals for rehabilitation, and then file an application
for an abatement with the Township.284 The Board would recom-
mend approval, and General Motors would be granted an abatement
275. 500 N.W.2d 104 (Mich. 1993).
276. Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., 506 N.W.2d 556, 559 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1993) (citation omitted) (citing Curry, 500 N.W.2d at 107).
277. Curry, 500 N.W.2d at 106.
278. Id. at 105.
279. Id.
280. See supra note 128 (discussing the buy-out plan available to the Curry's).
281. Curry, 500 N.W.2d at 106.
282. Id. at 110.
283. Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., 506 N.W.2d 556 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1993).
284. Id. at 558.
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for the maximum allowable period.285 Thereafter, General Motors
would provide continuous or increased employment for the people of
Ypsilanti.2 86 During the negotiations for the abatement in question,
a General Motors representative indicated that the corporation in-
tended to continue the trend and maintain continuous production
and employment at the Willow Run plant.2 87 Just as the Currys left
the bank satisfied that once again their future was secure, so did the
Township of Ypsilanti adjourn the public hearing.
In both cases, a long and continuous relationship carried on just
as it always had, until a parsimonious defendant broke the agree-
ment upon which it had led the aggrieved party to rely. Based on an
objective standard used to "determine the existence and scope of a
promise, we look to the words and actions of the transaction as well
as the nature of the relationship between the parties and the circum-
stances surrounding their actions."2 88 In Ypsilanti, as in Curry,
these factors point directly towards the existence of an actual, clear,
and definite promise.
Ypsilanti saw their relationship with General Motors as symbi-
otic, i.e., mutually beneficial, whereas General Motor's conduct
leads to the conclusion that they were acting under a different as-
sumption. It is the court's job to determine if the facts indicate that
General Motors lured Ypsilanti into a false, yet reasonable, sense of
security before revealing that assumption. The trial court properly
considered the long-term nature of the relationship between the par-
285. See supra notes 161-90 and accompanying text (discussing pattern of behavior subsequent
to application of P.A. 198 between the parties).
286. See supra notes 160-89.
287. See supra notes 178-182 (discussing the statements made by Mr. Williams and Mr.
Hughes). Additionally, on at least one occasion, General Motors explicitly stated their "dedi-
cat[ion] to retain and/or increase jobs at Ypsilanti and [to] maintain this dedication in the future.
[They] intend to keep this facility a viable operation for the community and General Motors."
Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., No. 92-43075-CK, 1993 WL 132385, at
*5 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Feb. 9, 1993), rev'd, 506 N.W.2d 556 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993). The court of
appeals made much of the fact that some of the course of conduct evidence, as well as the letter
quoted above, referred to the Hydra-Matic facility, and not specifically to Willow Run. Charter
Township of Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., 506 N.W.2d 556, 560 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
This ignores the fact that the parties followed the same series of events, regardless of which facil-
ity sought the abatement. It also fails to consider that both plants were inside of the same Indus-
trial Rehabilitation Zone, and that General Motors dealt with the same people, from the same
community, in seeking abatements for either plant. Ypsilanti, 1993 WL 132385, at *4. The letter
referred to specifically mentions the intention to retain/increase jobs for Ypsilanti, and not a spe-
cific plant. It is nearly impossible to attempt to separate the two, as throughout the relationship
what happened for one plant happened for the other.
288. State Bank of Standish v. Curry, 500 N.W.2d 104, 109 (Mich. 1993).
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ties, the fact that General Motor's had always followed through
with their representations in the past, and the fact that General Mo-
tors did not deviate substantially from its established pattern of be-
havior in this instance as indicating that a promise had been
made.2 89 Moreover, the conduct occurred during a relationship
based on trust in an economic setting, and is thus worthy of protec-
tion under the law."' It was the trial court's duty, as finder of fact,
to make those determinations.
2. Abuses of Discretion by the Court of Appeals
In reversing the opinion of the trial court, the reviewing court
abused its discretion by substituting its own impression of the course
of conduct evidence for that found by the trier of fact to support the
existence of a promise. The appellate court held that the actions
taken by General Motors in soliciting the many abatements they
received over the years "did not constitute assurances of continued
employment,"2 91 which would have bound the corporation to provid-
ing employment in Ypsilanti. Earlier in the opinion, however, the
court stated, while referring to the same course of conduct evidence,
that "the mere fact that a corporation solicits a tax abatement...
with assurances of jobs cannot be evidence of a promise."2 9 The
court of appeals characterized the same evidence as both an assur-
ance and not an assurance, which could either be sufficient or insuf-
ficient to support a claim. This shows that the evidence should be
considered ambiguous and open to interpretation. Because there are
two permissible views of this evidence (indicated by the reviewing
court's adoption of both of them), Beason v. Beason 98 requires ac-
ceptance of the trial court's view. "Where there are two permissible
views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot
be clearly erroneous. ' 294 Accordingly, the appeals court abused its
discretion by overruling the trial court and holding that the course
of conduct evidence did not support the finding of a promise.
289. Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., No. 92-43075-CK, 1993 WL
132385, at *1 1-14 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Feb. 9, 1993), rev'd, 506 N.W.2d 556 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
290. See Farber & Matheson, supra note 57, at 928-29 (discussing courts usage of promissory
estoppel in situations involving relationships based on trust).
291. Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., 506 N.W.2d 556, 560 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1993) (emphasis added).
292. Id. at 559 (emphasis added).
293. 460 N.W.2d 207 (Mich. 1990).
294. Id. at 212-13.
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The appellate court also erred in its application of the clearly er-
roneous standard by overruling other factual determinations made
by the trial court. Relying on Beason, the court of appeals said that
findings are clearly erroneous if the reviewing court is left with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake had been made.2 9 5 Al-
though Beason does support this proposition, 96 it goes on to indicate
that a trial court's determination is presumed to be correct9 7 and a
reviewing court should not substitute its own judgment if the initial
determination is plausible in light of the record viewed in its en-
tirety.298 Additionally, a reviewing court should give increased
weight to factual determinations made by the court which heard the
testimony and saw the witnesses.299 In this case, a key factual deter-
mination was the nature of Mr. Williams' statement at the public
hearing, 00 and whether that statement was promissory in nature.
The nature of the statement, for the appeals court, turned on the
phrase "subject to favorable market demand." 0 1 It was deemed to
qualify the antecedent remarks, which indicated that the abatement
would allow continued production and employment at Willow Run
in such a way as to make the statement insufficient to constitute a
promise.0 2 In making this decision, the court of appeals blatantly
disregarded the trial court's determination30 3 that General Motor's
characterization and post hoc definition of that phrase was unac-
ceptable, unsupported by the evidence, and not credible.304 The trial
court heard the evidence regarding this assertion and made a credi-
295. Ypsilanti, 506 N.W.2d at 558-59.
296. Beason, 460 N.W.2d at 212.
297. Id. at 213.
298. "[This standard] does not authorize a reviewing court to substitute its judgment for that
of the trial court; if the trial court's view of the evidence is plausible, the reviewing court may not
reverse." Id.
299. Id. at 212.
300. See supra notes 178-82 (quoting and discussing the statement made by Mr. Williams).
301. See supra note 245-46 and accompanying text (stating the court of appeals position re-
garding the statement by Mr. Williams).
302. Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., 506 NW.2d 556, 560-61 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1993); see supra notes 245-46 and accompanying text (discussing the statement of Mr.
Williams as analyzed by the appellate court).
303. "Although the parties greatly dispute what the speaker meant by 'favorable market de-
mand'..., the fact is that the statement qualified defendant's expectation. ... Ypsilanti, 506
N.W.2d at 561. Here, there is no consideration of alternatives, no balancing of possible interpreta-
tions, no weighing of evidence, only a flat statement of what the appeals court thinks the state-
ment means. This appears to be exactly the type of substitution of judgment the Beason court
sought to avoid. Beason v. Beason, 460 N.W.2d 207, 213 (Mich. 1990).
304. Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., No. 92-43075-CK, 1993 WL
132385, at *19 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Feb. 9, 1993), rev'd, 506 N.W.2d 556 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
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bility determination. General Motors (through Mr. Williams) as-
serted that the phrase was intended to mean that there was suffi-
cient demand to keep Willow Run and Arlington open for two shifts
per day.30 5 The trial court found that when looked at objectively, the
intent alleged by GM was suspect and the testimony not credible.
That decision was made in light of the fact that Arlington had not
been mentioned at the time the statement was originally made, and
the clarification of the "true" intent was made in the context of liti-
gation regarding the transfer of production to Arlington. 806 The in-
tent must be judged based on the expressed, not unexpressed, words
of the parties, and on an objective view of the statement. 80 7 The
credibility determination by the trial court should not be overturned
so easily.
Beason held that if evidence could be marshalled in support of a
determination contrary to that of the trial court, or if the interpreta-
tion was clearly unreasonable, a credibility decision could be over-
ruled.308 Such was not the case here. There was no evidence to sup-
port Mr. Williams' contention, made nearly five years after the
original statement, that Willow Run's production was in any way
contingent on work levels at Arlington. 0 9 The two plants had not
been mentioned in the same context to anyone who represented Yp-
silanti,3 10 and no evidence was produced at trial which tied the pro-
duction levels at the facilities together in any way. Additionally, it
would not have been unreasonable for Ypsilanti to interpret
"favorable market demand" to mean that as long as Caprice auto-
mobiles were being made, they would be made in Ypsilanti." The
reviewing court should not be permitted to merely substitute its
judgment as to the credibility of a statement for that of a lower
court which is in a better position to decide the matter.81 2 Mr. Wil-
liams' statement should be construed, as the trial court found, to be
305. Id.
306. See supra notes 208-10 and accompanying text (discussing the trial court's determination
of intent).
307. See supra notes 208-10 and accompanying text.
308. Beason, 460 N.W.2d at 213.
309. Ypsilanti, No. 92-43075-CK, 1993 WL 132385, at *12.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. "[I]f the trial court's 'account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in
its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting
as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently.'" Beason, 460 N.W.2d at 214
(Levin, J., concurring) (citing Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)).
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a legally sufficient promise to produce Caprice automobiles at Wil-
low Run for as long as there was a demand for those cars.3 13
2. Reasonable Reliance
The appellate court held that "[e]ven if the finding of a promise
could be sustained, reliance on the promise would not have been
reasonable." " " As support for this proposition, the court cited sev-
eral statements made during the public hearing on the abatement
regarding GM's lack of commitment to Ypsilanti. 15 The important
connection the court failed to make is that none of the people mak-
ing the statements represented the Township of Ypsilanti. The ma-
jority of the statements were made by members of the audience,
none of whom were exposed to the course of conduct detailed
herein.316 Nor were they privy to the details of the "education ses-
sions" conducted by General Motors to persuade the Township
Board to grant the abatement. As the full and true makeup of Gen-
eral Motors' promise could not be known without considering all the
evidence, and because none of the people were authorized to re-
present the Township or the defendant, these statements cannot re-
present the understanding of the parties to this suit. The court of
appeals obviously understood the importance of considering the par-
ties' interpretation of the agreement, as they summarily dismissed
as irrelevant the State Tax Commission's assessment that the abate-
ment would result in increased job opportunities. This statement
was dismissed because it was the Commission's position, not the de-
fendant's promise. The Ypsilanti township assessor said that GM
should be given the abatement because their prior conduct indicated
that they would keep the plant operational.31 8 Despite his position,
the assessor's remarks were given no credence by the appellate
court. The court held that the statement was his position, and not
the defendant's promise. Accordingly, relying on the opinion of un-
informed third parties as to the proper perception of the agreement
would be truly unreasonable. Yet, that is exactly what the appellate
313. Ypsilanti, No. 92-43075-CK, 1993 WL 132385, at *13.
314. Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., 506 N.W.2d 556, 561 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1993).
315. See supra note 247 (reciting statements made by Craiger, Smith, and Debs).
316. See supra notes 163-86 and accompanying text (detailing the course of conduct).
317. Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., 506 N.W.2d 556, 560 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1993) (negating the use of two separate Tax Commission statements).
318. Id.
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court did in overruling the finding for the plaintiffs.
The question to be resolved is whether General Motors could
"reasonably have expected to induce action of a definite and sub-
stantial character ...which in fact produced reliance or forbear-
ance of that nature."' 19 The trial court found that General Motors
must have expected to induce action of a definite and substantial
character by its promise of employment because Ypsilanti had no
other reason to grant the abatement, 20 a waiver of one-half of the
otherwise collectible property tax on GM's property.32' "[T]he deci-
sion to make this investment in Willow Run was made before Gen-
eral Motors pursued or even investigated the possibility of an Act
198 tax abatement . . . .General Motors was going to invest in
Willow Run regardless of the township's reaction to the tax abate-
ment application and the township knew it."'3 22 Because the invest-
ment decision already had been made and was widely reported in
the local news media, 23 the township did not need to grant the
abatement to get the new investment. The only other incentive of-
fered in exchange for the P.A. 198 abatement was the creation or
retention of employment.324 General Motors must have expected the
previous course of conduct, whereby abatements were exchanged for
jobs, to induce the abatement here; otherwise, there would have
been no reason for Ypsilanti to grant it. This shows a reasonable
expectation by the corporation to induce the action on the part of
the community.
Another indication that General Motors should reasonably have
expected to induce action was that the State Tax Commission's res-
olution based approval of the abatement on the "concern for eco-
nomic development in Washtenaw County which results in increased
job opportunities for unemployed and underemployed residents of
our County. ' '3 25 This shows that one arm of the government was
definitely relying on the promise of employment. It also should have
indicated to GM that other branches, Ypsilanti in particular, were
319. Nygard v. Nygard, 401 N.W.2d 323, 327 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
320. Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., No. 92-43075-CK, 1993 WL
132385, at *12-13 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Feb. 9, 1993), rev'd, 506 N.W.2d 556 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
321. Waiving one half of the property tax on a $75 million dollar project is obviously an action
of a definite and substantial character. The trial court pointed out that the money was needed for
providing education to local children and bettering municipal services. Id. at * 13.






likely to do the same, particularly due to the extensive history be-
tween the parties. The Tax Commission's position can be distin-
guished from the uninformed third party opinions relied on by the
appellate court because of the intimate role played by the commis-
sion in the P.A. 198 abatement process. 2 6 In order to receive an
abatement, GM must have approval at the second step in the pro-
cess from the Tax Commission, 27 making the commission's under-
standing of the terms of an agreement considerably more likely to
be fully informed. Evidence that a party essential to the granting of
an abatement relied on GM's promise must be seen as persuasive.
Because the reliance by Ypsilanti was reasonable, and induced by
GM's promise, the court of appeals erred in reversing the trial
court's decision for the plaintiffs.
3. Economic Necessity
The court of appeals also erred in allowing General Motors to
assert that the shutdown was necessary because of record losses and
a decreased demand for the product produced at Willow Run.3 8 In
this case, "General Motors has stipulated, as it must, that economic
necessity is not a defense."32 9 Accordingly, the appeals court should
not have allowed any argument by GM in favor of closing Willow
Run based on an economic motivation. Nor should the court have
based their decision on such an argument. Appellate "review is lim-
ited to issues actually decided by the trial court,"330 and as such, the
use of an economic argument which was not heard below leads to a
further weakening of the justification for reversal. The inappropri-
ateness of this argument 331 becomes even more apparent when ex-
326. See supra notes 247-48 and accompanying text (discussing the appellate court reliance on
third party statements).
327. See MicH. CoMP. LAWS § 207.559 (1975) (citing prerequisites).
328. Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., 506 N.W.2d 556, 558 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1993).
329. Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., No. 92-43075-CK, 1993 WL
132385, at *13 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Feb. 9, 1993), rev'd, 506 N.W.2d 556 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
330. Bay County Executive v. Bay County Bd. of Comm'rs, 443 N.W.2d 168, 173 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1989).
331. It seems that GM's use of an economic necessity argument is specious on other grounds as
well. Rather than being forced by economic concerns to choose between Willow Run and Arling-
ton, it appears GM was faced with the decision because that is the only option it chose to give
itself. The false dichotomy was created despite the fact that Willow Run had a reputation as an
"excellent plant" with an "outstanding" work record, and had consistently stayed within its
budget while other plants, which could easily have been considered for closure, did not. GM also
ignored its own bid policy, whereby each plant competes for the opportunity to produce various
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amining the appeals court's misguided reliance on precedents which
are easily distinguished because of their proper reliance on the eco-
nomic necessity defense and their discernably different fact patterns.
D. Comparison to Promissory Estoppel and Plant Closure
Precedents
1. Local 1330, United Steel Workers of America v. United States
Steel Corp.
In Local 1330, United Steel Workers of America v. United States
Steel Corp.,3 2 a federal court of appeals held that promissory estop-
pel could not be used to enjoin a plant closure.333 However, the situ-
ation in Youngstown, Ohio, where the facilities were located, was a
far cry from the one in Ypsilanti. In Youngstown, the promise to
keep the plant open, relied on by the plaintiffs, was made expressly
conditional on increased profitability of the plant.334 In effect, the
statements made by U.S. Steel were the proverbial carrot being
dangled in front of the mule to induce him to work just a little
harder. 35 U.S. Steel said they would keep the plant open if the em-
ployees made sufficient sacrifices, combined with management's ef-
forts, to put the Youngstown facilities "in the black." 336
The court allowed an economic necessity type defense because the
promise to keep the plant open hinged on profitability. 37 Accord-
ingly, a key determination for the court was whether or not the steel
foundries were in fact profitable. Without proving that the plant was
profitable,338 the plaintiffs could not rely on promissory estoppel be-
cause there was no promise on which to base their reasonable reli-
models of automobile, when it spent millions of dollars to give Willow Run the flexibility to pro-
duce front or rear wheel drive models. Brief in Support of Motion For Leave to Appear Amicus
Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellants' Application for Leave to Appeal and Motion for Stay at
38-41, Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., 506 N.W.2d 556 (Mich. Ct. App.
1993) (No. 161245).
332. 631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980).
333. Id. at 1279.
334. See supra notes 86-99 (discussing Local 1330).
335. In U.S. Steel, the court characterized the "promises" as "a major campaign [designed] to
enlist employee participation in an all-out effort to make [the plant] profitable in order to prevent
[its] being closed." U.S. Steel, 631 F.2d at 1277.
336. Id. at 1270-72.
337. Id.




ance. 83 9 The court found the plaintiffs' definition of profitability eco-
nomically infeasible,34 0 and thus, no promise existed that was
sufficient to justify the application of promissory estoppel.341
In the Willow Run scenario, even if General Motors' promise
could be analogized to U.S. Steel's statements (because it was sup-
posedly qualified by the infamous "subject to favorable market de-
mand" statement) " 2 there was no reasonable basis to assume that
determination of the demand necessary to keep Willow Run open
turned on the production status of the Arlington facility. Whereas
profitability can be defined in the context of standard corporate ac-
counting,3 43 no such convention exists to define "favorable" market
demand. There was no reason for Willow Run to concern itself with
Arlington's productivity. General Motors had never mentioned any
connection between the plants, " ' let alone one as significant as the
use of Arlington as a measuring stick for the continued operation of
Willow Run. It would be wholly unreasonable for General Motors to
assert that Ypsilanti could not rely on the promise of continued em-
ployment because of decreasing market demand affecting the Ar-
lington plant. Market demand in the context used by GM could and
should reasonably be construed to mean that so long as there was a
demand for Caprices to be made, they would be made in
Ypsilanti.4 5
The facts and circumstances in Ypsilanti and Youngstown were
sufficiently different to justify differing results in each case. Where
U.S. Steel had to close its plant or face continuing heavy losses, 34
General Motors explicitly agreed during trial that economic neces-
sity was not a defense to its closing of Willow Run because Willow
Run was operating profitably at the time of the shut-down., 7
Where the plaintiffs in Youngstown were unreasonable in relying on
339. In addition to the unreasonable definition of profitability, the trial court held that the
"hotline" messages should have indicated to the plaintiffs that a shutdown was imminent. United
Steel Workers of Am., Local No. 1330 v. United States Steel Corp., 492 F. Supp. 1, 6 (N.D. Ohio
1980).
340. Id. at 6-7 (discussing the reasonableness of the competing definitions of profitability).
341. Local 1330, United Steel Workers of Am. v. United States Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264,
1279 (6th Cir. 1980).
342. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
343. U.S. Steel, 631 F.2d at 1277-79.
344. Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., No. 92-43075-CK, 1993 WL
132385, at *12 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Feb. 9, 1993), rev'd, 506 N.W.2d 556 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
345. Id.
346. See supra notes 86-99 and accompanying text.
347. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
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the "promise" because of its contingency on a reasonable definition
of profitability which they did not use, Ypsilanti was well within
reason to rely on GM's statements, made in conjunction with over-
whelming course of conduct evidence indicating the corporation's in-
tent to provide continued employment.
2. Abbington v. Dayton Malleable, Inc.
The court of appeals also attempted to analogize the promise in
Ypsilanti to the statements of hope and possibility found in Ab-
bington v. Dayton Malleable, Inc.34 8 The appellate court's reference
to the statements in Abbington as "exhortations" 4 9 mischaracter-
izes the evidence. During the tent meeting called by Dayton Mallea-
ble to explain the situation, the company representative presented
two options to the assembled workers.350 The first was to simply
close the plant down. 351 This obviously exhorts no one. The second
option was the proposal to convert the plant to produce nodular
steel.35 2 The speaker qualified this option by indicating that the con-
version would cost between eight and ten million dollars, that it
would not happen unless the plant could cut operating losses, and
that prior to conversion, the company would need the approval of
the board of directors.353 In stating all the preconditions necessary
for a conversion to produce nodular steel, Dayton Malleable used
language which obviously reflected a clear intent to avoid making
any firm commitment. 54 Unlike General Motors, Dayton Malleable
avoided making a statement indicating that they might keep their
current production facility open. Accordingly, the statements by the
alleged promisor in Dayton did not meet the legal definition of a
promise, and the promisor could not be held liable for a breach
thereof.3 5
5
Further removing the statements in Dayton Malleable from the
scope of promissory estoppel, the speech concluded with the most
348. 561 F. Supp. 1290 (S.D. Ohio 1983), affd, 738 F.2d 438 (6th Cir. 1984).
349. Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., 506 N.W.2d 556, 559 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1993).
350. See supra notes 100-14 (discussing the facts of Abbington).
351. Abbington, 561 F. Supp. at 1292.
352. Id. at 1293.
353. Id. at 1293 n.5.
354. See supra notes 109-14 (giving choices and not stating that a plan had been made; stating
that there was no official approval; noting that the employees needed to make concessions).
355. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (providing the legal definition of promise).
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rousing exhortation of the day. "I'm confident that . . . we have at
least a chance to make this plant successful once again." 6 Reliance
on such a statement - which barely expresses hope, let alone confi-
dence or a firm indication of intent to comply in the future - as a
promise is nonsensical. The insubstantial nature of the statements
and complete unreasonableness of the plaintiffs in relying on them
as a promise clearly distinguish Dayton Malleable from Ypsilanti.
The appellate court's use of Dayton Malleable as analogous pre-
cedent is tenuous. Most importantly, the statements in that case are
not buttressed in any way by course of conduct evidence. There are
no past instances in which the employees had been led to rely on
similar statements. This was a one-time-only exchange between the
parties, unlike the deal between Ypsilanti and GM, who made simi-
lar agreements ten separate times in the past. 57
Moreover, the "promise" in Dayton Malleable was presented only
as an option. It was contingent on approval by parties unrepresented
and not in attendance at the meeting. It was also deliberately vague
and non-committal. It in no way resembled statements and actions
indicating that future conduct would be consistent with an estab-
lished pattern of behavior on which the Township of Ypsilanti rea-
sonably relied. The promissory estoppel claim failed in Abbington v.
Dayton Malleable because there was not the slightest possibility
that anyone could reasonably have relied on the statements. The
factual similarities between the cases end with the attempted use of
promissory estoppel to enjoin a plant closure, and certainly do not
extend to the sufficiency of the statement/promise relied on by the
respective plaintiffs.
3. Marine Transport Lines, Inc. v. International Organization of
Masters, Mates, & Pilots
The appellate court cited Marine Transport Lines, Inc. v. Interna-
tional Organization of Masters, Mates, & Pilots358 for the proposi-
tion that "hyperbole and puffery in seeking an advantage or conces-
sion [do] not necessarily create a promise. 3 59 The court in that case
found that statements such as "we're partners," and "we look for-
356. Abbington, 561 F. Supp. at 1297 (emphasis added).
357. See supra notes 163-86 (discussing the course of conduct between GM and Ypsilanti).
358. 636 F. Supp. 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
359. Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., 506 N.W.2d 556, 559 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1993).
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ward to growing together" were insufficient to constitute promises to
keep a collective bargaining agreement in force. 83 0 Although the
statements in Ypsilanti are more similar to those found not to be
promises in Marine than to those in Abbington, the context of the
declarations in Marine is easily distinguishable from Ypsilanti. In
the first place, the parties in Marine were adversaries in a labor
negotiation. They were in the midst of collective bargaining, during
which negotiations were at an impasse, the employer had stated its
refusal to recognize the union as the agent for bargaining, and the
employer had stated its intention to unilaterally impose certain
terms and conditions of employment. 61 Contrasted with the tradi-
tionally peaceful, symbiotic relationship of GM and Ypsilanti, the
antagonism in Marine illustrates a situation where puffery and hy-
perbole to gain advantage must be seen as not only reasonable, but
expected. The parties should have been aware that each was out to
gain as much for itself as possible. In Ypsilanti, however, there was
no need for such tactics. The parties had dealt honestly with one
another for many years, each continuing to get what they wanted
from the relationship. There was no adversity or conflict in the
abatement process, and neither party should reasonably have ex-
pected the other to suddenly make claims it had no intention to
keep.
Additionally, there was no course of conduct evidence available to
support the existence of a promise in Marine, as the parties' imme-
diate history was one of disagreement. The situation was also one in
which injustice would have been avoided by the use of promissory
estoppel. 62 The court held that it was the union's own actions which
led to expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, and thus,
the union could not use equity to reverse the effects of its conduct. 868
The court of appeals in Ypsilanti properly concluded that the lan-
guage in Marine was no more than hyperbole and puffery. There
should have been no doubt to either side that such niceties during
the course of tough labor negotiations were mere platitudes. 63 In
Ypsilanti, on the other hand, there was nothing to indicate that the
parties had any intent other than that which was expressed. The
360. Marine Transp. Lines. 636 F. Supp. at 391.
361. Id. at 386.
362. Id. at 391.
363. Id.
364. Id. (holding the nonpromissory nature of the statements was obvious because the parties
were represented by experienced labor negotiators).
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court's conclusion that GM's statements were insufficient to rise to
the level of a promise, even when combined with the course of con-
duct evidence, had a drastic and detrimental effect on the state of
the law in Michigan, and on the people of Ypsilanti.
IV. IMPACT
A. Impact on the Community
The most devastating impact of the decision will likely be on the
people and community of Ypsilanti. "[T]he loss of jobs resulting
from capital disinvestment has a major impact on the workers and
the community in which it occurs no matter where the capital is
relocated."3 65 General Motors may save itself some money and
carry on unaffected - or even better off - but Ypsilanti will not.
The devastation of the plant closure will ripple through individual
employees' lives, as well as through the community as a whole. It
has been documented that there is a "multiplier effect" when a
large employer shuts down, 6 ' where the harm caused by an initial
incident is followed by a series of repercussions which follow indi-
rectly from the incident and result in even greater total damage.
Like the aftershocks of an earthquake, the decline will continue in-
definitely in the future. The termination of purchases by the com-
pany reduces demand for local suppliers, requiring them to layoff
workers, or even shut down. 67 Even peripheral businesses are af-
fected. In Ypsilanti, the owner of a sandwich shop near the Willow
Run plant described the ripple effect clearly. "It used to take a five-
person shift to run this place. . . . If the plant closes, we cut every-
one but family." 86 8 The large scale layoffs and resulting decrease in
buying power of the displaced workers eventually lead to layoffs and
closures within the surrounding business community.36 9 The cycle
could continue, reducing tax revenue for the community as property,
sales, and excise taxes generate less and less governmental in-
come.37 0 This may lead to a decay in infrastructure,3 7 1 which leads
365. Barron, supra note 30, at 1390 (citation omitted).
366. Id. at 1396. A multiplier effect is a sociological term for a phenomenon where a precipitat-
ing cause sets off a chain reaction, exacerbating the problem created by the initial incident. See
supra notes 42-51 and accompanying text (illustrating the principle).
367. Barron, supra note 30, at 1396.
368. John Lippert & Joann Muller, GM Victory Clears Way To Shut Down Willow Run, DET.
FREE PRESS, Aug. 5, 1993, at Al.
369. Barron, supra note 30, at 1390, 1396-98.
370. Id. at 1398.
19951 1351
DEPA UL LAW REVIEW
to an inability to attract new business, thus compounding the
problem.
All of this occurs at a time when the need for publicly funded
social services is at its highest. Unemployed workers and their fami-
lies face a substantially higher risk of heart attacks, ulcers, respira-
tory ailments, suicide, depression, admission to mental institutions,
alcoholism, divorce, child abuse, and criminal activity. 72 The psy-
chological impact of a major plant closure on a community can be
devastating. When combined with the increased economic burden,
pressure on the community may be enough to foster an attitude that
the community is collapsing, which could prevent mobilization of
efforts to attract new businesses and industry. 73 The prophesy of
collapse may then become self-fulfilling, and the community might
wither away. The company that received the abatement, however,
will have taken its money and run, so as not to be caught up in the
race to the bottom. This is not equity under the law. 874
B. Impact on Michigan Promissory Estoppel Law
Equity under Michigan promissory estoppel law was impeded
when the court of appeals' opinion worked a change in the law di-
rectly contrary to precedent established in State Bank of Standish
v. Curry.3  The Supreme Court of Michigan used Curry as a vehi-
cle to expand the scope of protection offered by promissory estop-
pel . 76 Rather than require the actual wording of statements made
371. Id.
372. Id. (citing NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT PRIORITIES ACT: HEARING ON H.R. 76 BEFORE THE
SUBCOMM. ON LABOR STANDARDS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 100 (1978)).
373. Id. at 1396, 1398.
374. As an additional problem, the appeals court may have made an error of constitutional
proportions. The Michigan Constitution, Article 9, Section 18 prohibits the government from giv-
ing away tax dollars for nothing in return. By holding that P.A. 198 does not create a binding
contract or even a promise to retain jobs for the communities offering the abatements, the court
may have in effect forced the Act into unconstitutionality. If a municipality can get no relief when
a corporation takes tax dollars without providing any corresponding benefit to the community, this
will be an unconstitutional giving, like that found in Alan v. Wayne County, 200 N.W.2d 628
(Mich. 1972), which may require that all Act 198 abatements be revoked and repaid in order to
comply with the state constitution.
375. 500 N.W.2d 104 (Mich. 1993).
376. This can be seen in the court's disagreement with the Curry appellate court's narrow read-
ing of the record as not establishing a promise. State Bank of Standish v. Curry, 500 N.W.2d 104,
108 (Mich. 1993). It is also indicated by the fact that there was a dissent on the grounds that the
promise did not meet the standard of "clear and definite," which the dissent applied to minimize
the applicability of the course of conduct evidence. Id. at 111-15 (Riley, J., dissenting).
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by the promisor to meet the "clear and definite promise" standard,
the state supreme court expressly validated the use of factors such
as the nature of the relationship between the parties, and the cir-
cumstances surrounding the agreement, as important to the determi-
nation of the existence of a promise. 3 " The appellate court's dismis-
sal of the entire bulk of course of conduct evidence in Charter
Township of Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp. as "showing only
efforts to take advantage of a statutory opportunity"' 7 8 flagrantly
disregards the command of Curry to consider course of conduct evi-
dence. The Michigan Supreme Court's decision not to review Ypsi-
lanti may be seen as implicit support for ignoring course of conduct
evidence, which may cloud the issue for future litigants and stunt
the growth of the equitable doctrine. This possibility is exacerbated
by the short time period between the Curry and Ypsilanti deci-
sions 79 This combination of factors could set the law of promissory
estoppel back to its pre-Curry status, and wipe out a well justified,
well reasoned extension of the equitable doctrine.
V. CONCLUSION
The use of promissory estoppel to prevent the closure of a facility
which was granted a tax abatement after making promises of re-
tained or increased employment is wholly consistent with the equita-
ble nature of the doctrine. The Court of Appeals of Michigan made
a grave error in reversing the trial court's determination that the
Township of Ypsilanti had reasonably relied on promises made by
General Motors in seeking an abatement under Public Act 198. The
statements made by GM, when considered properly in the context of
the course of conduct evidence, clearly support Ypsilanti's reasona-
ble reliance on the promise. Injustice can be avoided only by en-
forcement of the defendant's promise of retained or increased em-
ployment for the community.
Adam Michael Lett
377. Id. at 108-09.
378. Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., 506 N.W.2d 556, 560 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1993).
379. Curry was decided on April 13, 1993, during the interim between the Ypsilanti trial and
appeal. Four months later, on August 3, 1993, the appellate court misread Curry as supporting
the dismissal of Ypsilanti's claim.
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APPENDIX 1
Joint Statement by the Charter Township of Ypsilanti, Washtenaw
County and General Motors Corporation regarding tentative
agreement.
Representatives of the Charter Township of Ypsilanti, Washtenaw
County and General Motors today announced that they have
reached an Agreement aimed at restoring the good working rela-
tionships they had enjoyed for many years. General Motors contin-
ues to own and operate a large transmission plant in Ypsilanti
Township and owns the Willow Run Assembly Plant property that
closed last year.
The highlights of the Agreement are as follows:
The parties will cooperate in pursuing a productive reuse of the
closed Willow Run Assembly Plant site.
GM will pursue reuse, redevelopment or sale of the Willow Run
Assembly Plant site and will remove equipment and other ob-
structions to prepare the site. The Township will be informed of
progress in pursuing reuse of the site.
GM will conduct any environment assessment and cleanup of
the Assembly Plant site that may be required for compliance
with Michigan and federal law.
The Township and County will provide assistance by retaining
the Industrial Development District, and meeting with prospec-
tive purchasers to discuss the availability of tax incentives or
other accommodations.
The Agreement also provides for cooperation between the parties in
the continued operations at the GM Powertrain Group Transmission
Plant.
GM will be proceeding with investments in 1994 for projects
that are expected to involve aggregate investments of approxi-
mately $80 million in new equipment and machinery.
The Township and County will be supporting GM's investments
by retaining the Plant Rehabilitation District and new 12 year
tax abatements for the investments.
Under the new amendments to the Michigan tax abatement law,
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for the first time there will be a tax abatement contract that will
give the Township and County the right to seek part of the
abated taxes after the first six years following the construction
period if employment targets are not achieved.
The Agreement further provides for the parties to participate in the
Washtenaw Development Council and the Willow Run Airport Eco-
nomic Opportunity Center Steering Committee.
To avoid tax assessment disputes, the Agreement provides for the
parties to cooperate in determining an equitable assessment annu-
ally for the GM properties.
GM has agreed to donate certain computer and office equipment for
use in the County's new Ethel M. Howard Training Center.
Lastly, the remaining claims in the lawsuit over the Willow Run
Assembly Plant closing will be dismissed.
The assistance of court appointed Special Master Douglas Kahn, a
law professor at the University of Michigan Law School, was inval-
uable in reaching the Agreement. The Township, County and Gen-






This Agreement ("Agreement") is entered into this 25th day of
April, 1994 between the Charter Township of Ypsilanti (the "Town-
ship"), the County of Washtenaw County (the "County"), the State
of Michigan, and General Motors Corporation ("GM"), through
their undersigned authorized representatives.
RECITALS
A. For many years, GM has operated two large manufacturing fa-
cilities located in the Township - the Willow Run Assembly Plant
("Willow Run") and the GM Powertrain Group Willow Run Trans-
mission Plant ("Hydramatic"). These plants have provided employ-
ment to thousands of Township and County residents. The Town-
ship and County, and their residents have benefitted from having
GM as an employer, taxpayer, and corporate citizen.
B. For many years, the Township and County have passed resolu-
tions approving substantial tax abatements to GM. These tax abate-
ments have been an incentive to GM investing hundreds of millions
of dollars at Willow Run and Hydramatic by reducing the property
taxes on GM's investments by millions of dollars.
C. During most of these years, the Township, the County, and
GM worked together in a spirit of mutual respect and cooperation.
For example, GM has played an active role in the community by
encouraging employee contributions and making corporate contribu-
tions to the Washtenaw County United Way and having employees
serve in a variety of community organizations.
D. In December 1991, GM announced that the operations of Wil-
low Run and a plant in Arlington, Texas would be consolidated and
one of the plants would be closed as part of an overall plan to re-
duce excess manufacturing capacity to improve its competitiveness.
On February 24, 1992, GM announced that the consolidation would
be at the Arlington plant and that Willow Run would cease opera-
tion by the Summer of 1993.
E. On April 29, 1992, the Township filed suit against GM in an
effort to keep Willow Run open. The decision to bring suit against
GM was difficult for the Township and County, but they concluded
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that this action was necessary to protect the rights and interests of
their citizens. The Township and County stand by their decision.
F. In September 1993, GM began consolidation at the Arlington
plant and ceased production at Willow Run. In connection with the
Willow Run plant closing and its efforts to sell or otherwise dispose
of the Willow Run Assembly Plant property, and in accordance
with its regular procedures for the closing and disposition of indus-
trial properties GM plans to:
1. conduct any environmental assessment and remediation that
may be required for compliance with Michigan and federal
law at the Willow Run site.
2. evaluate the prospects for reuse and/or redevelopment of
Willow Run.
3. maintain the property and prepare the site for reuse or dis-
position in an appropriate manner consistent with its mar-
keting effort, including any selective demolition that it
deems necessary.
G. After extensive litigation and negotiations, GM, the Township,
and the County have reached this Agreement in an effort to improve
relations, to restore mutual respect, to serve the common interests of
the parties, and to resolve all pending disputes. Dismissal of the law-
suit is also expected to facilitate efforts to reuse, redevelop and/or
sell the Willow Run site. Renewed use of the Willow Run site and
employment associated with such renewed use would be expected to
increase participation in and contributions to charitable and com-
munity organizations serving the Township and Country.
AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES
Wherefore, the parties hereto agree as follows:
1. GM will make reasonable efforts to pursue reuse, redevelopment
and/or sale of the Willow Run site. GM agrees to advise the Town-
ship Treasurer of the status of efforts to pursue the reuse, redevelop-
ment and/or sale of the Willow Run site in writing at least one time
every three months following the date of execution of this agreement
and to give appropriate consideration to their views concerning
GM's plans for reuse, redevelopment and/or sale. As part of its ef-
forts, GM will remove machinery, equipment and other obstruction
within the facility to prepare the site for reuse/redevelopment and/
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or sale. While GM may elect to demolish selected portions of the
facility as part of its reuse, redevelopment and/or sale efforts, GM
will not demolish the entire facility unless and until it determines
that further reuse redevelopment and/or sale efforts will not be rea-
sonably likely to be successful within a reasonable period of time.
2. GM plans to proceed with two new investments at Hydramatic
which are estimated to involve an aggregate investment of approxi-
mately $80 million. GM will begin to invest in new machinery and/
or equipment for these projects in 1994.
3. GM agrees to conduct any environmental assessment and
remediation that is required for its compliance with Michigan and
federal law at Willow Run. Documents submitted to the Michigan
Department of Natural Resource and/or the United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency regarding any such environmental assess-
ment and remediation will be be available for public inspection.
4. GM agrees to designate an individual(s) to participate on its
behalf on the Washtenaw Development Council and the Willow
Run Airport Economic Opportunity Center Steering Committee.
5. GM agrees to donate the computer and office equipment and
furniture listed on the Attachment to this Agreement for the use of
the Ethel M. Howard Training Center.
6. The Township and County agree to assist GM in its efforts to
pursue reuse, redevelopment and/or sale of Willow Run. To this
end, the Township and County specifically agree as follows:
A. The Township and County will not revoke any Industrial
Development District currently in existence at Willow Run
for twenty (20) years, unless requested by GM.
B. The Township and County will designate individuals to par-
ticipate on their behalf in the Washtenaw Development
Council and the Willow Run Airport Economic Opportunity
Center Steering Committee.
C. At GM's request, the Township and County agree to meet
with representatives of GM and/or any purchaser or pro-
spective purchaser of Willow Run to discuss the availability
of Industrial Facilities Exemption Certificates of such other
special accommodations as the purchaser or prospective
purchaser may wish to propose.
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7. The parties concur that it is in their mutual best interests to (i)
provide GM with incentives to invest in Hydramatic and maintain
employment there, (ii) provide the Township and County with in-
centive to confer tax relief for GM, (iii) allow GM flexibility to deal
with changing business conditions, and (iv) protect the Township
and County in the event that tax relief granted ceases to continue to
serve the public interest. To achieve these mutual objectives, the
parties agree as follows:
A. GM agrees to request, and the Township and County agree
to approve, an Industrial Facilities Exemption Certificate
for a duration of twelve (12) years, plus the allowable con-
struction period, provided that GM proceeds with its
planned 1994 investments at Hydramatic.
B. The Township and County agree that they will not revoke
any Plant Rehabilitation District currently in existence at
Hydramatic for twenty (20) years.
C. The parties agree that the goal of the planned 1994 invest-
ments at Hydramatic are to maintain employment of 729
full time employees by increasing capacity on front drive
transmissions and 158 full time employees by increasing ca-
pacity on rear drive transmissions and engineering support.
D. GM shall be deemed to achieved these employment goals if
the actual number of full time employees at the two invest-
ment projects does not fall below 729 and 158, respectively,
on average for any year following the allowed construction
period plus six years after the issuance of the Industrial Fa-
cilities Exemption Certificate ("Certificate") for the
planned 1994 investments at Hydramatic.
E. In the event that the average number of full time employees
at the two investment facilities at Hydramatic falls below
729 and 158, respectively, for any annual period following
the allowed construction period plus six years after the issu-
ance of the Industrial Facilities Exemption Certificate
("employment shortfall"), GM shall notify the Township
within 30 days thereafter. For purposes of calculating the
employment shortfall, downtime at the facility for which a
Certificate is granted due to model changeovers, parts
shortages as a result of parts quality or availability of raw
materials, strikes, and acts of God shall not be included.
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F. In the event of an employment shortfall, the Township and
County shall confer with GM and, if they are not satisfied
that the objectives of the Certificate are being served, may
demand, and GM shall pay, an amount not to exceed the
proportion of the taxes saved as result of the Certificate for
the investment facility for which the year in which there is
an employment shortfall which is equal to the proportion of
that employment shortfall to the total employment goal for
that investment facility. The following example illustrates
the application of this provision:
For example, if the employment goal for an invest-
ment facility were 500 full time employees and the
average anual employment for the investment facility
for the year following the construction period plus six
years after the issuance of the Certificate is 450, the
Township and County may demand that GM pay an
amount of up to ten (10) percent of the property taxes
saved as a result of the Certificate on the investment
facility for the year in which there is an employment
shortfall.
G. It is understood and agreed that GM does not agree to
maintain any specified level of employment for any period
of time. GM sole obligation in the event of an employment
shortfall as defined herein is to pay a portion of the prop-
erty taxes on the investment facility saved as a result of the
Certificate as provided herein.
8. GM and the Township and County agree to cooperate in deter-
mining an equitable assessment annually for each of the next three
years for the Willow Run and Hydramatic properties.
9. GM, the Township, the County, and the State will execute a
stipulated Order dismissing with prejudice the lawsuit entitled
Charter Township of Ypsilanti, et al v. General Motors Corp., Case
No. 92-43075-CK, pending in Washtenaw County Circuit Court.
No party shall recover any costs or attorneys' fees related to this
lawsuit or any of the attendant appeals, and this shall be reflected in
the stipulated order.
10. This Agreement is the entire agreement of the parties relating
to the matters covered by the Agreement, and no prior or subse-
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quent promises, representations or assurances, whether oral or in
writing or in any other form, shall be used to modify, vary or con-
tradict any provision of this Agreement, except for any written
amendment to this Agreement or separate agreement signed follow-
ing the date of this Agreement by authorized representatives of all
parties to this Agreement.




/s/ Wesley E. Prater
By: Wesley E. Prater
Township Supervisor
/s/ Brenda L. Stumbo
By: Brenda L. Stumbo
Township Clerk
WASHTENAW COUNTY
/s/ Robert E. Guenzel
By: Robert E. Guenzel
County Counsel




By: Lee A. Schutzman
Attorney
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ATTACHMENT
GM CONTRIBUTION TO ETHEL M. HOWARD TRAINING
CENTER
Following is a list of computer and office equipment that will be
donated to the Ethel M. Howard Training Center. These computers
and office equipment have been used in General Motors operations
and are in functional condition.
QUANTITY DESCRIPTION
25 AT or XT IBM Compatible
PC's
2 Apple Mac's with Laser
Printer for Prep of Resumes
-25 Lotus Work Sheets
-25 IBM Writing Assistant
-DOS and Menu Software






2 Dry Marker Boards
2 Secretarial Desks
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